Multum in Parvo contra *Parvum in Multo*,

OR A

SIX DAYS CANDID REVIEW

OF A

SIX YEARS Uncandid Controverſy:

WHEREIN

Mr. PHIPPS's Arguments in Defence of QUAKERISM, in his *Obſervations*, and *The original and preſent State of Man*, againſt Mr. NEWTON of *Norwich*, are ſhewn to be *defective*; and the Doctrines of *Abſolute Neceſſity* and *Univerſal Redemption* fairly deduced from *ſome* of the *Quakers* Principles, as laid down in *Barclay's* and *Phipps's* Writings.

ADDRESSED TO

The People called QUAKERS in particular,

BY

One who was formerly a Member of that CHRISTIAN SOCIETY.

Either convince my Underſtanding by the *Light of Truth* and Power of REASON, or bear down my INFIDELITY with the Force of MIRACLES. — W. PENN.

Every Obſervation carries its *own Evidence*, but it may not be a *true Evidence*. PHIPPS's *Preſent State*, &c. p. 115.

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M.DCC.LXXIII.

BRITISH MUSEUM

PREFACE.

Candid Reader,

THIS brief *Review* was written and ſent to the preſs within a week after I ſaw Mr. Phipps's laſt *Eſſay*, as I was deſirous it might be publiſhed during the ſitting of the Quakers yearly meeting; excuſe, therefore, any trivial inaccuracies. As I ſtudied brevity, where I have taken the liberty to leave out a part of a ſentence in any quotation, the reader will perceive the ſenſe of it is not injured or left incomplete: and if I have miſquoted any author, made falſe references, omitted to make ſome, or perverted the meaning of any word or term in a propoſition; it was done ignorantly, and without a deſign to miſrepreſent. In my opinion, both Mr. Phipps and Mr. Newton would do well to add to their faith a little more of that cardinal virtue, called CHARITY, which "*is* "*not eaſily provoked*;" they appear to poſſeſs more *anger* than *pity*, though I do not *charge them.* By a colliſion of different intereſts and notions, the paſſions are ſometimes too much agitated; and anger, like lightening, may glance even into the hearts of wiſe men, but "*it reſteth* only *in the bo-*"*ſom of fools.*" "*Let not the ſun go down on thy* "*wrath*" is an excellent precept; for it is no

wonder men are miſled, when they are left in the dark with no better companion.

Mr. Phipps ſeems to diſapprove of the word "*notion*," as well as the "*bald phraſe*," *damned*, in Mr. Newton's performance; but Mr. Barclay incautiouſly made *notions* the *main foundation of piety*. P. 17, Apol. it is one of the terms of the "*firſt* "*principle*" which he *affirmed*.‡ *Shift the wallet* is a proverb in the North, which we ſhould all do well to obſerve; the meaning of it is, that we are apt to carry other peoples faults in view before us, while our own are out of ſight behind us. The Quakers too have often found fault with their opponents for uſing technical and unſcriptural terms; but do they not know that they have themſelves a peculiar phraſeology, and make uſe of terms which are not ſcriptural nor generally underſtood? — "*Integrals of the Chriſtian religion*;" "*head-*" "*knowledge*;" "*hiſtorical or verbal Chriſtianity*;" "*modicum*;" "*vehiculum Dei*;" "*formal object*;" "*ſeed of ſin*;" "*ſomewhat*;" "*ſemi-deiſt*." I do not find theſe phraſes in the ſcriptures. *Who can underſtand his errors?* Pſalm xix. 20. How partial and blind we are to ourſelves! however, let us not lean on our weak ſide, for that will not *ſtrengthen* it: "*Caſt out firſt the beam out of thine own eye*, "*and*

‡ Mr. Barclay, p. 3, adopts Epictetus's ſentiment; lays it down as a *firſt principle*, and *affirms* it. *Know that the foundation of piety is this, to have right notions and apprehenſions of God.* — This I deny. Mr. Barclay miſſed his road in his firſt ſetting out. The apoſtle tells us of a people, who *worſhipped* an *unknown God*: and can any worſhip God, and not have the main foundation of piety? or have right notions of him, while they are ignorant of him? SINCERITY, an affection of the mind, and not *notions*, is, in my apprehenſion, the broad main foundation of piety, capable of admitting the honeſt-hearted, though ignorant of every *notion* and *nation* under heaven.

" *and then ſhalt thou ſee clearly to pull out the mote* " *that is in thy brother's eye.*" Luke vi. 42.

P. 8. Mr. Phipps finds fault with Mr. Newton's elucidation of the *Divine Sovereignty*. Mr. Newton calls it " SOMETHING *in the Deity, that pro-* " *ceeds from, or is directed by, infinite and unerring* " *reaſon.*" " *This* (ſays Mr. Phipps) *is juſt as clear* " *and definite, as if he had ſaid, It is* I DO NOT " KNOW WHAT; *and demonſtrates he is as much at a* " *leſs about it, as he is about Ariſtotle's occult quali-* " *ties.*" Was this candid? Was not this cenſure " *drawn by the crooked hand of prejudice?* Is Mr. Barclay's LITTLE SMALL THING, or Mr. Phipps's SOMEWHAT, a clearer elucidation of the *Divine Light*, than Mr. Newton's SOMETHING is of the *Divine Sovereignty?* Are not *Barclay* and *Phipps* as much *at a loſs about it, as he is about Ariſtotle's occult qualities?* Mr. Phipps ſaid, p. 164, he would anſwer Mr. Newton " *without returning his incivili-* " *ties:*" How partial ſometimes good men are to themſelves!

I will not ſay " *I have followed the certain light* " *of truth*" in this *Review*; that " *it is given forth* " *by the Spirit of the Lord*;" that " *it is the word* " *of the Lord*; or that " *the mouth of the Lord hath* " *ſpoken it:*" — phraſes made uſe of by Mr. Barclay: — but what I have written proceeded from a ſenſe of duty. I know I am fallible and liable to err; but, if I have erred, I will not aggravate my errors, by charging them upon the infinitely and holy God, as it appears ſome people have incautiouſly and ignorantly done.

Mr. Barclay, on a review of his Apology, p. 572, which he calls a " *ſyſtem*," perhaps with too much ſelf-complacence, pronounced it *good*; his own words are, " *This ſyſtem of religion has a con-* " *ſiſtency and harmony, as well with itſelf as with the* " *ſcriptures*

" *ſcriptures of truth*;" and ſays he had " *eſtabliſhed* " *the Chriſtian religion in all its parts.*" I wiſh the young man (*who I hear was but twenty eight years of age when he wrote the Apology*) had not been quite ſo confident. Poſitive poſitions demand proofs. He ſhould firſt have ſhewn, (as Mr. Phipps ſays to Mr. Newton, p. 124.) " *that he* " *had the* infallible criterion *in his poſſeſſion.*" If Mr. Barclay's *ſyſtem* is conſiſtent with itſelf, the ſcriptures, or right reaſon, I am deceived; if he has " *eſtabliſhed the Chriſtian religion in all its parts,*" I am ignorant of ſeveral parts of them.

Mr. Newton ſays, p. 11, he was credibly informed that Mr. Phipps's piece had been *reviſed* or *corrected* by an *aſſembly of wiſe men*: had his informant ſaid, an *aſſembly of honeſt-hearted men*, it would have been nearer the truth: every man of a *good ſpirit* has not a clear underſtanding; an *honeſt heart* and a *weak head* are often united. I do not think that pieces, reviſed, curtailed, and altered, by *bodies of men*, have been ſo conſiſtent with themſelves, or with truth, as ſome of the productions of *individuals*. The *Weſtminſter* and *Augsbourg confeſſions*, with the *articles of the church of England*, and the publications of *ſynods* and *councils*, are notoriouſly inconſiſtent with themſelves. A *body*, compoſed of fallible members, muſt needs be but fallible. Ten-thouſand cyphers cannot make an unit. Amongſt many men, you meet with many minds, or opinions and prejudices; no two men, however *influenced*, agree about *every thing*; and ſcarcely about any *one thing* that is not *ſelf-evident*: and, amongſt *bodies* of men, each having an equal right to reviſe, correct, and propoſe alterations, and a mutual condeſcenſion prevailing, notions mixed and jumbled together have produced a literary *chaos*, *without form, and void*, having *darkneſs*

darkneſs on the very face of it, containing the elements of *every thing* but LIGHT, without the regularity or form of *any thing*. I have no doubt but that Mr. Phipp's pieces had *fewer* errors in them when they were carried into the *aſſembly*, than when they were brought out of it; and I think it has been a diſadvantage to Mr. Phipps, in the controverſy, that he had not the liberty of publiſhing his *Obſervations* and the *Preſent ſtate of man, &c.* till they had obtained the ſanction of an *aſſembly*, the members of which may be termed *licenſers of the quakers preſs*; for it ſeems a perſon cannot enjoy the liberty of the preſs *in* that ſociety; which, in all other ſocieties, as well as in the body politic of England, is deemed the common privilege and birth-right of Engliſhmen: and, on what conſiſtent principles, the *many* of that Chriſtian ſociety can transfer their *private right of judgement*, in matters of *faith*, to a *few*, (perhaps not the wiſeſt amongſt them,) and conſtitute them *public judges of controverſy*, is to me as inconceivable as *Ariſtotle's occult qualities*. But the Quakers, who ſometimes call themſelves the *Iſrael of God*, have their בית ספר or *the houſe of the book*, and their בית תורמור or *the houſe of doctrine*: but it does not appear to me that they were inſtituted by the *God of Iſrael*.

ERRATA.

ERRATA.

P.	L.	
13.	16.	Read Phipps *and* Barclay.
18.	7.	Read *Heathens.*
19.	24.	Read *Heathens.*
20.	10.	Read to pay *tithes.*
21.	14.	Read *Heathens.*
35.	17.	Read comes into the world *unendued.*
42.	16.	Dele *true.*
56.	4.	Read *As* Mr. Phipps ſays.
	12.	Read *When* ſome feel.
62.	8.	Read *ſufficiency.*
68.	23.	Read received *it.*
70.	7.	Read had *ſpoken* " ſome things.

MR. PHIPPS's obſervations, on the ſeveral heads of *ſcripture* and *reaſon*, may, with equal propriety, be made on *immediate revelation* and *inſpiration*. See p. 5, 6, and 7, of his *Obſervations*, &c.

For men, pretending to *inſpiration*, differ as much about the ſenſe of ſcripture as *carnal reaſoners*; nor are the quakers themſelves agreed about the ſenſe of ſome doctrines, ſaid to be *eſſential*.

An *eminent preacher* amongſt them, actively, and upon principle, contributes to the ſupport of the *national militia*, and ſhuts up his ſhop on *faſt-days*. Many amongſt them, of unexceptionable moral characters, and of ſound piety, pay *tithes* and *church-rates*; and as many different opinions, ſometimes, are broached in their *yearly-meeting*, as among any congregation of reputed unenlightened men. The ſenſe of *one* yearly-meeting has not always been the ſenſe of *ſucceeding* ones. A great number of reſpectable quakers *took up arms* in *Philadelphia* a few years ago, and went in perſon to aſſiſt the *governor* againſt a body of ruffians: and, it is very remarkable, worthy, pious, well-meaning men amongſt them, who make the higheſt pretenſions, even to "*the gift of diſcerning ſpirits*," have evinced the greateſt degree of *fallibility* and *ignorance*; and have been impoſed on more than the reſt.

Mr. Phipps ſays, p. 6, Obſervations, " *Our* " *author* (i. e. Mr. Newton) *makes high pretenſions* " *to right reaſon alſo, which he threatens us with as* " *if he had the perfect maſtery of it.*"

Alter the term *reaſon*, to *inſpiration*, or *revelation*, and the ſentence may be ſent back to *Mr. Phipps* with *equal* force of argument. Our author, *Mr. Phipps*, makes high pretenſions to *immediate revelation* alſo, which he threatens us with, as if he had the perfect maſtery of it. We may talk, indeed, as Mr. Phipps ſays, of *reaſon*, of *balancing things by the* SPIRIT OF GOD, *when we mean only our weak limited faculty*; and ſuffer ourſelves to be impoſed on by certain unaccountable ſenſations, which we know no more of than that they are unaccountable, while we attempt to impoſe them on others for ſupernatural revelations:—But I do not mean to deny *rational* inſpiration, for I verily believe it, and intend to give the world my thoughts upon it at ſome future period †.

P. 136, *of his laſt Eſſay*, Mr. Phipps allows that a diſagreement in opinions about the ſenſe of ſcripture, among thoſe who profeſs the Spirit's illuminations, ſhews " *that the pretenſions of both* " *parties could not be right, but not that neither of* " *them were ſo*:"— granted:— and will not Mr. Phipps allow, that a diſagreement in opinions about the ſenſe of ſcripture among thoſe who profeſs that the " Spirit's illumination," A and B, ſee p. 132, is not neceſſary, but that human learning and reaſon are ſufficient, while it ſhews, that the pretenſions of both parties to reaſon could not be right, does not ſhew that neither of them poſſeſſed

† A well-meaning old woman, who, though of the ſociety, ſeems to have no unity with it, often makes ſuch long puerile effuſions as muſt be diſguſting to every ſenſible hearer in White-hart-court.

poſſeſſed it, or that human reaſon is inſufficient to judge of the ſenſe of ſcripture, *any more than that it would prove the apoſtle Paul, and Elymas the ſorcerer, or Jeremiah, and Hananiah, equally wrong in their pretenſions?*

Mr. Phipps aſked, "What is *man's reaſon*, but "man's underſtanding? and that naturally liable to "various biaſſes. It is not the ſoul's *light* in ſpiri-"tuals, but its *organ*, as the *eye* is that of the body, "not formed to be, but to receive, the *light*, by "which right diſcerning and diſtinction is given." But he tells us, in p. 23, that Mr. Barclay's doctrine is, *that the Holy Spirit communicates itſelf* (but he has amended his bill, and ſays *ſomewhat* from itſelf) *to the faithful ſoul, and becomes to it a new* PRINCIPLE, *or* ORGAN, *whereby it is capacitated rightly to underſtand religious truths.* He adds, *the word* ORGAN, *in Barclay, is metaphorical; and I ſhould hope no honeſt reader could conclude he intended any new* NATURAL FACULTY *by it.* Are not *Barclay* and *Phipps* of oppoſite ſentiments on this important point? *Phipps* ſays *reaſon*, "*ſubject to* "*various biaſſes*," is the ORGAN: but he makes *Barclay* ſay, the *Holy Spirit itſelf*, or *ſomewhat* from itſelf, is the ORGAN; but *Barclay*'s avowed doctrine, is *ſomewhat* that does not, in my opinion, agree with either of theſe definitions. In a letter to *Heer Adrian Paëts*, (ſee Sewel's Hiſt. of Quakers,) *Barclay* ſays, "*Now if there be ſuch ſuper-*"*natural ideas, there are alſo ſenſes, or perceptive* "*faculties, by which thoſe ideas are perceived; for* "*theſe are two relatives that ſuppoſe and infer one* "*another; but, in wicked men, thoſe ſenſes or fa-*"*culties do, as it were, ſleep (as the viſive faculty* "*of a blind man;) but in the godly they are ſtirred* "*up. Now, by theſe divine and* SPIRITUAL SENSES, "*which are* DISTINCT *and* DISTINGUISHABLE *from*

" *all the* NATURAL FACULTIES *of the ſoul, whether* " *of imagination, or* NATURAL REASON, *ſpiritual-* " *minded men do behold the glory and beauty of God,* " *and hear God inwardly ſpeaking.*" Hence it appears that man is endued with *two ſets of intellectual faculties.*

In p. 52, of *Mr. Phipps's Original and preſent State of Man*, we are taught a contrary doctrine: " *that no ſuch abſurdity is required as to lay aſide* " *and renounce* reaſon, *to obtain* a better *under-* " *ſtanding.*" He allows that the idea is " *prepoſte-* " *rous.*" And, in p. 54, he ſays, " *the holy men of* " *God were not deprived of their underſtandings* " *when they ſpoke and wrote as they were moved by* " *the* HOLY GHOST, *but found them illuminated:* " *Their faculties were brightened.*" The divine illumination, he ſays, " *neither baniſhes* MAN'S *reaſon,* " *nor deprives it of its utility.*" Now a queſtion ariſes, who was divinely illuminated and infallibly inſpired? The ſociety has given its ſanction to the doctrines of both *Barclay* and *Phipps*, whom we will allow an equal degree of piety, and ſincerity; and that they neither meant to deceive themſelves, nor impoſe on others. Mr. *Phipps* allows, (p. 5, *Obſervations,*) whoſoever maintains a *ſenſe*, " *which is not that of the Spirit, muſt himſelf* " *be of a wrong ſpirit.*"

Barclay aſſerts, (p. 133, Apology,) " the di- " vine light, or ſeed, is not the proper eſſence " and *nature* of God, preciſely taken, which is " not diviſible into *parts* and *meaſures*, as being " a moſt pure and ſimple Being, but a *ſpiritual* " and inviſible *principle*, in which *God*, as *Father*, " *Son* and *Spirit*, dwells——the VEHICULUM DEI, " or the ſpiritual body of Chriſt —— the fleſh and " blood of Chriſt, which came down from hea- " ven." *Keith, in his Way to the city of God*, p. 130,

130, ſays, that this *light*, or *ſeed*, " is a middle " nature, *ſubſtance*, or being, betwixt the God- " head and mankind." Hence may be inferred, (as theſe doctrines were publiſhed by order of the ſociety,) 1ſt, That the Quakers *light*, or *ſeed*, that enlighteneth every man, is not, properly ſpeaking, the *Spirit* of God, but the *body* of God, a *middle nature*, that is neither *human* nor *divine*.— 2dly, That this *light*, or *ſeed*, is a *creature*, unleſs it can be ſhewn, that there is any medium betwixt *God* and *creature*. — 3dly, That this *light*, or *ſeed*, is a *material* creature, or it could not be *diviſible* into *parts* and *meaſures*, which do not agree with any ſpiritual or immaterial ſubſtance, as Mr. Phipps acknowledges reſpecting the ſoul of man, ſee p. 13.— 4thly, That this *light*, or *ſeed*, is an *inferior* being to the ſoul of man; for all ſpiritual natures are *inferior* to material ones.— 5thly, That this *light*, or *ſeed*, is *unconſcious*, and *unintelligent*; unleſs it be granted that a material ſubſtance is capable of *conſciouſneſs* and *intelligence*. Theſe inferences are fairly deduced from the premiſſes laid down by *Barclay* and *Keith*, and *avowed* by the ſociety of the people called Quakers, as the doctrines of *true Chriſtian divinity*; but it is *myſterious divinity* to me; yet I hope thoſe who broached it *are at reſt*; and that thoſe who hold it will *find reſt*.

Mr. *Phipps* and the Quakers decry the ſubtilties of ſophiſtry and ſchool-divinity, as having tended to miſlead and confound, inſtead of informing, mens judgments: but may not Mr. Phipps's words be properly applied to the Quakers? p. 214, " When perſons read, and preſume to " expound, the ſcriptures, with ſchool and college " methods uppermoſt in their heads, it is no " wonder they miſtake them." It is to be regretted

gretted that Barclay and Keith launched out ſo far into the immenſe ocean of metaphyſics.

P. 71, Apology. — *The ſcriptures are ſaid to be not the* " *principal ground of truth.*" The *letters* in them, it is true, are not; but is not the ſenſe deſigned by thoſe letters the *ground of truth*, or *truth itſelf?*

The apologiſt and Mr. Phipps agree, that " *the* " *ſcriptures are not the adequate rule of faith*," nor to be underſtood unleſs the Holy Ghoſt interprets them; but if the words made uſe of in them are adapted to inſpire that *faith* which God *deſigned* in them that *read*, or *hear them read*, are they not the adequate rule of that *faith?* To what purpoſe does the Holy Ghoſt addreſs the *bodily ſenſes* in *human terms*, if they are not to be underſtood, according to the common acception of thoſe terms, amongſt *human beings*, or without *internal immediate revelation* to fix their ſenſe? If a man writes a letter to a friend which no other perſon than himſelf can interpret, to what wiſe purpoſe did he write and ſend it at all? Might he not as well have not wrote at all?

If Mr. *Barclay*'s doctrine be true, a *ploughman*, ignorant of *Hebrew* and *Greek*, might have as clear ideas of the ſenſe of them when he looks into a *Hebrew bible*, and *Greek teſtament*, as when he reads them in his own tongue: for, as to the ſenſe of *the letter*, it ſeems it *killeth:* it is the interpretation which the Holy Ghoſt gives that is the *true*, *living*, and *ſaving knowledge:* and the Holy Ghoſt could interpret the meaning of *Hebrew* and *Greek* words to him, as eaſily as *Engliſh* ones.

Mr. Phipps, p. 9, Obſervations, ſays, " *Man's* " *reaſon* (i. e. man's underſtanding) *is not the ſoul's* " LIGHT *in ſpirituals, but its* ORGAN, *as the* EYE *is* " *that of the body.*" — With equal propriety it may

may be ſaid, that *man's reaſon, or underſtanding*, is but the ſoul's *organ* in *naturals*: the ſoul cannot apprehend a demonſtration in *Euclid*, till it is manifeſted to man's *reaſon* or *underſtanding*, which is the *eye* of the mind; neither can the ſoul apprehend the ſenſe of any propoſition, *mediately* or *immediately* propoſed, *natural* or *divine*, till its *reaſon* or *underſtanding* conceives the meaning of the terms of that propoſition. *Reaſon* is that intellectual capacity by which a man is to judge of *ſpirituals*, as well as *naturals*, to aſcertain the meaning of the *ſcriptures*, as well as a *theorem in the ſciences*.—*Reaſon* (Mr. Locke ſays,) *is* "*man's laſt judge and* "*guide in every thing:*"—it is reaſon that muſt judge of *divine* revelation from *diabolical*; for, it ſeems, we are ſubject to both:—"*he, therefore,* "*that will not give himſelf up to all the extrava-* "*gances of deluſion and error, muſt bring this guide* "*of the* LIGHT WITHIN *to a trial.*" Eſſay on Human Underſtanding, p. 323.

P. 47, Obſervations.—"*This faithful* WIT-"NESS (i. e. the divine light) *riſes in the conſcience* "*of* ALL, *at times, where it ſmites for evil con-* "*ceptions, intents, and acts. It not only ſhews what* "*is wrong to be ſo, but alſo* DEMONSTRATES *itſelf* "*to be good, in that it* ALWAYS *brings trouble on* "*the mind for evil, giving it a painful ſenſe of di-* "*vine pleaſure.*"——P. 46, Obſervations, he ſays, "*Through the goodneſs of God it early accompanies* "EVERY *ſoul of man, and gives a* DISTINCT *con-* "*ſciouſneſs of* GOOD *and* EVIL:"—let my reader particularly note the words ALL, ALWAYS, DISTINCT, and EVERY.

"*If we look abroad* (ſays the judicious *Locke*, Eſſay, p. 35.) "*to take a view of men as they are,* "*we ſhall find, that they have remorſe, in one place,* "*for doing or omitting, that which others, in an-*

"*other*

" *other place, think they merit by*;" — the *witneſs*, as it is called, ſeems to produce no diſagreeable ſenſations in the mind of a *Chineſe*, the *Perſus*, the *Talapoins*, an *Arab*, a *Mahometan*, and many others, from practices which are deemed evils by Europeans in general, and by moſt *groſs idolatries*. A *Mahometan's* WITNESS gives him an agreeable ſenſation when he follows the directions of the *Alcoran*; and a *Chineſe*, when he languiſhes by the wounds and bruiſes occaſioned by the wheels of his god's chariot, which he threw himſelf under from a ſenſe of religious duty.— Hiſt. des Incas, l. 1. c. xii, informs us, that " *the* TOUOUPINAMBOS " *believe that they merit paradiſe by revenge, and* " *eating abundance of their enemies.*" And *Locke* ſays, p. 35, " *That the ſaints, who are canonized* " *amongſt the Turks, lived lives which one cannot,* " *with modeſty, relate.*"

He alſo tells us, that, in ſome places, the living children are interred in the ſame grave with their deceaſed mothers; in others, they are diſpatched if pretended aſtrologers declare them to have unhappy ſtars; that the *Mengrelians* (CHRISTIANS) bury their children alive without ſcruple; that there are places where they eat their own children; that the *Caribbees* geld their children, on purpoſe to fat and eat them; that in PERU they fat and eat the children begot on female ſlaves; that the virtue, which the *Tououpinambos* think they merit Paradiſe for, is the eating abundance of their enemies; they have not ſo much as a name for God, any acknowledgement of him, nor any religious worſhip; that others leave their children in the fields to be devoured of wild beaſts. So far *Locke*.

The women of *Madagaſcar* believe that there are unfortunate days and hours; and it is a duty of their religion, when any of them are delivered

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in an unfortunate day or hour, to expoſe the infants to be devoured of wild beaſts, to bury them alive, or to ſtrangle them.

In one of the temples of the empire of *Pegu*, a virgin is educated, and ſacrificed to the idol every year: the *prieſt*, in his ſacerdotal robes, ſtrangles her, plucks out her heart, and throws it into the idol's face. In other temples ſome country-men are ſacrificed. Innocent blood, ſay the *prieſts*, ought to flow, to expiate the ſins of the nation; beſides, it is neceſſary, ſay they, that ſome ſhould go to the great God, to put him in mind of his people.

In the capital of *Cochin*, they bring up crocodiles; and whoſoever expoſes himſelf to the fury of one of theſe animals, and is devoured, is reckoned among the *elect*.

In the kingdom of *Martemban*, it is an act of virtue, on the day when the idol is brought out, for the people to throw themſelves under the wheels of his chariot, or to cut their throats as he paſſes by; and whoever offers himſelf to death is a reputed ſaint, and his name is regiſtered in a book.

It is a crime for a bramin to marry a virgin. In the iſland of *Formoſa*, the people go naked for three months: in the ſame iſland it is reckoned a ſin for a woman to have a child before ſhe is thirty-five years old; if they are pregnant, therefore, they extend themſelves at the foot of the prieſteſs, who, in execution of the laws, tramples upon them till ſhe cauſes them to miſcarry.

When the prieſts or magicians of *Pegu* have foretold the death of the ſick, it is a crime for them to recover: if he had been good, ſay the prieſts, God would have received him into his company.

The *Giagues* devour their conquered enemies: they are allowed, ſays father *Cavari*, to pound their children in a mortar, with roots, oil, and leaves; to boil them, and form the whole into a paſte, with which they rub their bodies, to render them invulnerable.

The natives of *Canibal-bay*, on the coaſt of New-Zealand, kill, dreſs, and eat, the priſoners they take in war; and reckon human fleſh the moſt delicious food.

In the country of the *Giagues*, it would be reckoned an abomination not to maſſacre, with the blows of a ſpade, a young man and woman, in the month of March, before the *queen* of the country. When the corn is ripe, the queen, ſurrounded by her courtiers, leaves the palace, and, cutting the throats of thoſe ſhe finds in her way, gives them her retinue to eat: theſe ſacrifices, ſhe pretends, are neceſſary to appeaſe the ghoſts of her anceſtors, who ſee, with regret, the common people enjoy a life of which they are deprived; this poor conſolation, they imagine, may prevail on them to bleſs the harveſt.

In the kingdoms of *Congo*, *Angola*, and *Matamba*, the huſband may, without diſgrace, ſell his wife, the father his ſon, and the ſon his father. In theſe countries they know only one crime, that of refuſing the firſt-fruits of the harveſt to *Chitombe*, who is the *high-prieſt* of the nation.

At *Tonquin*, where fruitfulneſs is highly honoured, the pain, by law, impoſed on barren women, is, to ſearch for agreeable girls, and to bring them to their huſbands: they maintain, that, when there is an opportunity, it is as criminal not to give life to what is not, as to take it from thoſe who already have it.

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In the kingdom of *Batema* every woman, of what condition ſoever, is obliged, by law, to yield to the embraces of whoever deſires it; a refuſal is a ſentence of death.

In the iſland of *Formoſa*, drunkenneſs and lewdneſs are acts of religion.

Among the *Giagues*, when a girl has the ſigns of being capable of bearing children, they make a feaſt; but when thoſe ſigns diſappear, they put the woman to death, as unworthy of life when they can no longer communicate it.

In the kingdom of *Thebet*, the young women wear about their necks the gifts of lewdneſs; that is, the rings of their gallants; and, the more they have, with the greater ſplendor and rejoicings are their nuptials celebrated.

At *Babylon*, all the women were to encamp near the temple of Venus, and, once in their life-time, by an expiatory proſtitution, obtain the remiſſion of their ſins; they were not to deny the deſire of the ſtranger, who was for purifying their ſouls by enjoying their bodies.

In how many countries, ſays Cicero, are temples erected to debauchery!

In *Malabar* and *Madagaſcar*, all the women are faithful, becauſe they have gallants without number; and they never pitch on a huſband till after repeated trials. It is the ſame with the ſavages of New Orleans †.

† All the barbarous nations pretend the obligation of duty and *conſcience* for their abſurd inhuman rites and ceremonies; their ultimate reaſon is the ſame. "I *feel* that ſuch is my "duty; my *conſcience* tells me ſo."

Formerly, in *England*, large cages, filled with men, were ſacrificed at once; and this was performed as a religious act ‡.

Locke, in his chapter on Enthuſiaſm, ſpeaking of fanatics, ſays, " Whatever groundleſs opinion " comes to ſettle itſelf ſtrongly upon their fancies " is an *illumination from the Spirit of God*; and " preſently of *divine authority*; and whatſoever " odd action they find in themſelves a ſtrong in- " clination to do, that impulſe is concluded to be " a call, or direction, from heaven, and muſt be " obeyed: it is a commiſſion from above, and " they cannot err in executing it. Reaſon is " loſt upon them; they are above it; they ſee " the light infuſed into their underſtanding, and " cannot be miſtaken. It is clear and viſible " there, like the light of the bright ſun-ſhine; " ſhews itſelf, and needs no other proof but its " own evidence: they feel the hand of God mo- " ving them within, and the impulſes of the Spirit, " and cannot be miſtaken in what they feel. Thus " they ſupport themſelves, and are ſure reaſon " hath nothing to do with what they ſee and feel in " themſelves; what they have a ſenſible expe- " rience of, admits no doubt, needs no probation. " Would it not be ridiculous in a man, who ſhould " require to have it proved to him, that the light " ſhines, and that he ſaw it? It is its own proof, " and can have no other. When the Spirit brings " *light* into our minds, it diſpels darkneſs; we " ſee it, as we do that of the ſun at noon, and " need not the *twilight* of *reaſon* to ſhew it us. " This *light from heaven* is ſtrong, clear, and " pure; carries its own demonſtration with it;

" and

‡ See Rapin, Dampier, Salmon, Jeſuits Travels, Pliny, and Herodotus.

" and we may as rationally take a *glow-worm* to " aſſiſt us to diſcover the ſun, as to examine the " *celeſtial ray* by our *dim* candle and *reaſon*.

" This is the way of talking of theſe men: they " are *ſure*, becauſe they are *ſure*; and their per- " ſuaſions are *right*, only becauſe they are *ſtrong* " in them. For, when what they ſay is ſtripped " of the *metaphor* of *ſeeing* and *feeling*, this is all " they amount to; and yet theſe ſimiles ſo im- " poſe on them, that they ſerve them for certainty " in themſelves, and demonſtration to others." Eſſay, 319 and 320.

If he that denies Mr. *Phipps's doctrine* " *deſerves* " *no credit*;" he that affirms it will not, I preſume, gain much, unleſs he can bring clearer proofs of it than *Phipps* or *Barclay* have done. It is true, all men may pretend that they have a *diſtinct conſciouſneſs of good and evil*; but, when we compare the ſeveral notions of *good* and *evil*, amongſt mankind, we ſhall find them different in moſt, and directly oppoſite in many. There was, at one time, a large company of people executed in Smithfield, in the *reign of king Henry the eighth*;— ſome for being ſtedfaſt to *popery*; and others for embracing *Luther's tenets*. Of one party there were *Buttolph*, *Danelipſis*, *Philpot*, and *Brinholm*. And of *Luther's*, *Barnes*, *Gerard*, and *Gerome*: doubtleſs both parties thought they had a *diſtinct conſciouſneſs of good and evil*: both parties were borne up in confidence, to the laſt moment, that they were ſuffering for the truth; and it is not to be imagined that *mere ideas in the head* gave them that courage and conſtancy, but *ſenſations felt at heart*.— Now it may be aſked, whether the *papiſts* that ſuffered, did not give *as evident* a demonſtration that they were ſupported by *divine ſenſations*, and that they had a *diſtinct conſciouſneſs of right and wrong*, *good*

and

and evil, as the *Lutherans*, who ſuffered for different opinions?

Inward ſenſation, is, indeed, the *primary* rule, &c. to fanatics in general, of every denomination. Such points or articles of faith, and religious practices, which, to uſe a favourite phraſe of theirs, *ſit eaſy upon their minds*, or produce lively and agreeable ſenſations, they conclude, at all events, muſt infallibly be true and orthodox. When human reaſon cannot be compelled into their ſervice, to aſſert, defend, and explain, the rectitude of any article of faith or practice, which they hold, or are found in, they immediately take ſanctuary in darkneſs, defend themſelves by cavil and chicane; and they find themſelves inwardly ſupported, "by *ſenſations felt at heart*," to brook all oppoſition and obloquy, and are ſupported even under the violence of perſecution unto death, with the greateſt magnanimity;—who, therefore, can diſpute the divinity of their principles?

On a review of the hiſtory of mankind, I find, amongſt others, the following perſons and ſects, in particular, who profeſſed the doctrine of immediate revelation, and ſupernatural influences.—The prophets of *Dauphiné*, and their followers; the ſhepherdeſs of *Crete*, Mr. *Jurieu*, *Chriſtiana*, *Poniotovia*, *Bourignon*, *Kotter*, *Frabicius*, and their followers; *Camiſſars*, *Cavalie*, *Roland*, *Catinat*, *Ravanel*, *Roſicrucians*, *Zigenners*, *Anabaptiſts* of Munſter, *Moravians*, *Mennonites*, *Preadamites*, *Antomines*, *Hebraicks*, *Quietiſts*, *Quakers*, and *Methodiſts*; moſt of them *pretended* to evince the truth of their doctrines, by the *purity* of their morals, ſincerity, and *unaffected* piety; fortitude in the *moſt* afflictive ſcenes, *prophecies*, *miracles* †, *dying ſayings*, and

† See *Whitfield's* and *Weſtley's*, and *Fox's*, Journals, and *Sewel's* Hiſt. of the Quakers.

and ſome of them by *martyrdom*. They were *all* confident, beyond the leaſt doubt, that their doctrines, revelations, and influences, were divine, though many of their tenets and practices were as oppoſite to each other as the poles. Every ſect, alſo, attempted to ſhew, that its tenets were to be found in the ſcriptures †.

If you converſe with fanatics, in general, you will ſcarce meet with one out of a hundred who can give you any more *reaſon* of the "hope that "is in him," than a Mahometan, Bramin, Talapoin, a diſciple of Sommonocodo, or a Faquir. They

† Romans iii. 14. "*The Gentiles do, by nature, the things "contained in the law*;"— not by *man's* nature, ſays Mr. *Barclay*, p. 100, *Apology*;— then, it ſeems, a word muſt be added to fix the ſenſe of this text, and it runs thus: *The Gentiles do by* GOD'S NATURE, *or a* DIVINE NATURE, &c. When the people read the *ſcriptures*, they take the liberty to *add words* to, or *take words* from, them, to ſupport a particular *ſyſtem*, or *hypotheſis*. In ſome parts *all*, or the *whole*, is ſaid to mean but a *part*; in others, a *part* means *all*, or the *whole*. If people render the words of the ſcriptures in a direct contrary meaning to that in which ſuch words are accepted among men, according to the conſtruction of *human language*, do they not attempt to *improve upon the Holy Ghoſt itſelf*, or teach the *Holy Spirit* how it ſhould have expreſſed itſelf, by its *ſervants*? If the Holy Spirit made uſe of one term, or word, and we ſubſtitute another, is it not as much as to ſay the Holy Spirit ſpoke *improperly*, and ſaid *one thing*, while it meant *another*; or that it was not happy in the choice of its *words*, or *terms*? and if we *leave out* words in ſome parts of the ſcriptures, and *add words* to others, does it not imply that the Holy Spirit ſaid *too much* in ſome parts, and *too little* in others. Thus ſome *words*, *terms*, and *phraſes*, in the *ſcriptures*, have been ſo much *altered*, *changed*, and *tranſpoſed*, by the confeſſed inferior wiſdom of men, to ſuit the particular ſyſtems, or hypotheſes, they have eſpouſed, that the meaning of the Holy Spirit, which dictated the ſcriptures, is rendered ſo indeterminate, that many of the honeſt and *ſimple-hearted*, attached to no party, and who wiſh not to be deceived themſelves, nor to deceive others, ſcarce know what to think of them.

They are ſure they are right, becauſe they poſſeſs certain agreeable lively ſenſations at heart, which, without the leaſt heſitation, are taken for the influences of a *Chriſt within them*, the hope of their glory.— Here they exult, and they will exult, in ſpite of all the arguments of man's wiſdom, which is fooliſhneſs with them, whoſe greateſt honour is to be eſteemed *fools* for *Chriſt's* ſake. — Attempt to ridicule ſome of their abſurdities, and you afford them a ſtriking proof of their rectitude, which is evinced to them as clear as the ſun at noon-day, when "*men count their lives madneſs, and their* "*end without honour*;" and nothing can be a greater proof to them that they are of the number of the *wiſe*, if the world, that lives in wickedneſs, brands them with the appellation of *fools*.

If you attempt to confute any of their doctrines out of the ſcriptures, it will be as ineffectual, as a ſailor's whiſtling to raiſe the wind: your ſenſe of ſcripture is carnal; a *killing*, literal, ſoaring, airy, notional, ſenſe, conceived in the head: whereas they have an expoſition on the ſcriptures written by the *finger of God, upon the* "*fleſhly table of the* "*heart*," a ſaving, *felt*, heart knowledge.— Should you tell them, modeſtly, that you are alſo inſpired, and can prove, by reaſon, and the nature of things, that you have the right ſenſe of any text, then, if your ſenſe of it is different from theirs, you are ſuppoſed to be under a deluſion; Anti-chriſt has deceived you with his ſerpentine wiſdom.—— The *Spirit of truth*, ſay they, is at unity with itſelf, and is *one*, and *leads all thoſe who faithfully follow it, and are baptized by it, to be one in* FAITH, *in* CHARITY, *in* PRINCIPLE, *and in* PRACTICE. See the Quakers yearly Epiſtles, 1767, and 1769.—— Our opinions and yours are different, the Spirit of God could not be the author of both, and we know

know we have the *Spirit*, and the right ſenſe, *ergo* you are deceived.—This is a ſpecimen of the logic, which fanatics pretend to have learnt in the ſchool of Chriſt, and it is, certainly, very different from that learnt in the book of the *man* WATTS.

As a certain author ſays, " Falſe principles and " abſurd notions of God and religion, wrought " early into the tender unexperienced mind, and " there radicated and confirmed, from time to " time, from youth to riper age, by parents, " teachers, our moſt intimate friends and ac- " quaintance, and ſuch as we have the beſt opi- " nion of, and confide moſt in; ſuch cauſes, I " ſay, as theſe, make ſuch ſtrong impreſſions, " and produce ſuch inward ſenſations, that the " groſſeſt errors, thus rivited and fixed, are, with " the greateſt difficulty, ever conquered or cleared " off. In this caſe men are armed againſt all ra- " tional conviction, and the moſt groſs and pal- " pable errors are the moſt invincible. Theſe " well-grounded believers will read but one ſort " of books, and converſe with but one ſort of " men; and all others they look upon as dan- " gerous intruders, and invaders of that ſacred " depoſitum of error, which they are to receive " for truth, and never freely to examine. The " maſters and conductors of their education, have " cantoned out for them a little *Goſhen*, in the in- " tellectual world, where they imagine truth " ſhines, and day-light bleſſes them; but the reſt " of the vaſt expanſe they give up to eternal " night and darkneſs, and avoid coming near; " nay, they ſhut their eyes, ſtruggle againſt ra- " tional conviction, and are frightened at the " appearance of truth, if it ſeems to ſhine out of " their own province, or to diſcover any of the " abſurdities and deformities of their own party

" They dare not enquire farther, or hearken to " any reaſons which would diſturb them in the " quiet peaceable poſſeſſion of their divine right, " of taking every thing upon truſt of *inward* " *ſenſation*, and believing without rational evi- " dence."

Let me aſk Mr. Phipps, whether any *Heathen*, (of whom there are doubtleſs many millions in the world,) who are *ſincerely*, and *conſciencioufly*, Polytheiſts and Idolaters, and obſerve ſuch practices as are immoral, under a firm perſuaſion of religious duty, can be ſuppoſed *faithful* to the light, *redeemed* from a worldly ſpirit, and *ſanctified*, while they hold ſuch errors, and are found in ſuch practices? if they are not, what will be the fate of millions? if they are, what becomes of Mr. Barclay's doctrine of *ſanctification and ſinleſs perfection*, as he ſtated it? or how could he diſpenſe with the doctrine of *imputative righteouſneſs, without either faith or works?*

The *Quakers* will, perhaps, ſay, the ſincere Heathen, who are Polytheiſts and Idolaters, follow the *dictates of an erroneous conſcience*.—Well, ſuppoſe it be granted,—Mr. *Barclay*, (p. 487, Apology,) ſays, a man is bound to adhere to them, " *though it may be falſe or evil upon the matter*, " *yet if a man ſhould go againſt his conſcience or per-* " *ſuaſion, he ſhould commit* SIN." " *Conſcience, to* " *define it truly*, (ſays Barclay, p. 146.) *comes from* " conſcire, *and is that knowledge which ariſeth in* " *man's heart, from what agreeth, contradicteth, or* " *is contrary to any thing believed by him; whereby* " *he becomes conſcious to himſelf that he tranſgreſſeth,* " *by doing that which he is perſuaded he ought not to* " *do*."—He inſtances, in the ſame page, the *Turk's* conſcience, which *accuſes* him when he " drinks wine;" but *juſtifies* him in *keeping concu-*

bines.—

bines.—" *And if a Papiſt* (ſays Barclay) *eats fleſh in* " *Lent, or be not diligent in adoration of ſaints and* " *images, his conſcience would ſmite him for it.*" And he ſays, " *the light of Chriſt in him, if it were* " *minded, would reprove him*, i. e. *the Turk, not* " *only for committing fornication, but alſo, as became* " *obedient thereto, inform him that* MAHOMET *was* " *an* IMPOSTOR; *as well as* SOCRATES *was informed* " *by it, in his day, of the* falſity of the HEATHEN " GODS:"— But when you talk of a divine light to a *Turk*, or to a *Heathen*, who is a *Polytheiſt*, they know not what you mean; they know of no *principles*, or *light*, ſuperior to that of their *erroneous conſciences*, which is to him divine, and which the *Turk* feels juſtifies him in keeping a concubine, and the *Heathen* when he duly proſtrates himſelf before his idols:— you tell him to mind the *light within*, but he cannot, is not conſcious of your principle, cannot believe it is divine, nor regard its teachings, for *his erroneous conſcience ſake*; which, if he did contrary thereto, Mr. Barclay acknowledges *would be ſin.*

It does not appear that *Socrates* was inſtructed ſuperior to the Heathen, among whom he dwelt, by an inward ſupernatural light, diſtinct from that by which he perceived natural truths, but by the exerciſe of *reaſon* ‡, and attempting to ſuppreſs thoſe inward emotions and ſenſations which tradition had impoſed on his mind, and which inclined him to adhere to their idolatrous tenets;

‡ Mr. Barclay allows, p. 144, Apology, " *that* man's *rea-* " *ſon can diſcern things that are rational.*" Are there any doctrines in the ſcriptures, or any Chriſtian duties, that are not rational?— If there are not, then man's reaſon can diſcern them; and if there are, can faith in, and obedience to, them, be our " *reaſonable ſervice*," or can we give a *reaſon* for them?

nevertheleſs, thoſe inward emotions, "felt at heart" in his weak moments, when his faculties were broken and diſordered by affliction, aſſumed their former prerogative, and prompted him to order a *cock to be offered to Eſculapius.*

If a perſon, who, from the *exerciſe* of his reaſon, has detected the errors of the Quakers, and forſaken their practices, ſhould, in ſome future period, when his reaſoning powers are enervated by bodily affliction, refuſe to pay, to take an oath, or to ſend out a *ſubſtitute for the militia*, which demands he formerly complied with, the Quakers, I preſume, would immediately attribute the effect of human weakneſs, in that inſtance of it, to the ſecret convictions of the *Spirit*, for his *apoſtacy from the faith and practices of the Quakers*; whereas, it might be nothing more than the remains of thoſe prejudices which education and tradition formerly impoſed on his judgment; which, people of all parties find, at times, ſtick very cloſe to them, even after they are convinced that they are fallacious.

If we converſe with the moſt authentic hiſtories extant, we ſhall find that, in the *barbarous*, ignorant, nations, where *reaſon* has not been cultivated, the inhabitants are principally Polytheiſts. *The* WITNESS *for God*, as it is called, *in every man's conſcience*, has not imprinted upon the mind of man what is termed even the firſt principle of true religion, the *unity of God*, or pure *theiſm*: It is, therefore, no wonder it does not give mankind a diſtinct conſciouſneſs of moral *good* and *evil*.

The Quakers ſay, that the moſt diſtant inhabitants of the earth are, or may be, benefited by Chriſt, though they never heard even of his name; for the *divine light* enlighteneth every man, and the goſpel of Chriſt is preached *in* every creature:

ture: But what is that *goſpel* that is preached *in* every creature? Is it the doctrines that Chriſt, and his apoſtles, or the Quakers, preach? What are the eſſentials of the Chriſtian religion which is preached inwardly to the Heathen? Mr. Barclay has told us, that "*an hiſtorical faith*" are only *integrals*; and I wiſh the Quakers, as they profeſs to be guided by the infallible Spirit of God, would let us know, *what thoſe eſſential articles of the Chriſtian religion are, without a belief in which a man cannot be a Chriſtian, or be* ſaved.——The Quakers tell us of a *principle*, or *divine light*, an *internal grace* of God, that came by Jeſus Chriſt to the Heathen; but does it appear that the Heathen, who never heard of Chriſt, nor the ſcriptures, are more enlightened, or have ſtronger or different motives to influence them to virtue, than they had two thouſand years ago? Human nature appears to be the ſame every where ſince, as it was before, the coming of Chriſt; and the prejudices, ignorance, and fooleries, of the greateſt part of mankind, Chriſtians as well as Heathens, as palpable as ever. If there really was a divine principle in man, diſtinct from *human reaſon*, and the *common light of nature* †, *that formal object of our faith, in naturals*, one would imagine it would be ſuperior to the prejudices and biaſſes which education and tradition impoſe upon millions, and which prevent their having a *diſtinct conſciouſneſs of good and evil.*—Multitudes, in all nations, ſhew the utmoſt readineſs to ſacrifice every temporal pleaſure and bleſſing, even life itſelf, for that which they take to be their religious duty. The Chineſe, Bramin, Turk, and Faquir, count *all things*

† I do not mean, by *nature*, any thing independent of God, for God is the *author* and *ſupport* of nature.

things but as loſs, as droſs, as dung, and love not their lives unto death, that they may be found acceptable in the ſight of God! The prejudices, which tradition has impoſed upon Heathens, prompt many of them, from the beſt motives, to endure the moſt ſevere mortifications and penances, to render the gods propitious to them and to purchaſe future happineſs; and, till thoſe prejudices are removed, they cannot aſſent to the doctrines of true religion, of which *theiſm* is ſaid to be the *firſt*; and theſe prejudices the *divine light*, or *ſeed*, as Mr. *Barclay* terms it, does not remove, which, one might imagine, would be the firſt operation of a *divine ſupernatural principle of intelligence implanted in the human mind.*

The Quakers differ widely, on many points of faith and practice, from moſt other Chriſtian ſocieties, whom they charitably ſuppoſe are blinded by the prejudices of education and tradition; in the ſame light they look upon the heathen world: but, ſuppoſe they were to meet a Talapoin, or Chineſe, and tell him that his faith and practice is erroneous, and that he is blinded by prejudice, and therefore cannot perceive the excellence of true religion, or Mr. *Barclay's Apology for the true Chriſtian divinity:* he might reply;—If I am blinded by *prejudice* and *tradition*, it is no wonder that I cannot *perceive* the divinity of your *ſyſtem:* —this prejudice, if you call it *prejudice*, God knows, I cannot remove from my mind; and if there really is ſuch a *ſupernatural light*, or *principle*, as your *Apology* aſſerts, I am really blinded by *prejudice:* this internal principle would do for me what I cannot do for myſelf, (eſpecially as I am honeſtly and ſincerely diſpoſed to follow the cleareſt convictions I can acquire in the affair of religion;) it would take off theſe *motes of prejudice* from my viſive

viſive faculties, which have blinded my judgement. ——If am deceived, I am ſtill ſincere, and, therefore, I preſume, a ſuitable object of God's goodneſs to be better inſtructed by the *divine light* you ſo much talk of, as being the *gift of God to all men.*— The beſt *light* I have been able to acquire teaches me to worſhip the god *Foe*, who ſhould have divine adoration paid to him; and, in paying him that tribute, I find my mind comforted by inexpreſſible "ſenſations felt at heart."

God has endued, or conſtituted, mankind with intellectual powers, capable of inveſtigating the ſecondary cauſes of ſome phænomena in the natural world; and we perceive that ſome effects flow neceſſarily from certain known cauſes; while the cauſes of numerous phænomena exceed the limits of the human underſtanding to comprehend, and baffle all the efforts of our philoſophical reſearches. Some of the phænomena, whoſe cauſes are inexplicable to the human intellect, are called adventitious, and others ſupernatural and miraculous, and the *occaſional* interpoſitions of the Deity, to effect ſome wiſe and good end: but may not ſuch phænomena, whoſe cauſes we cannot explore, be as agreeable to the eſtabliſhed laws, and courſe of nature, which are God's laws, as others which we are capable aſcertaining to a mathematical nicety? The cauſes of the eruptions of mount Etna, earthquakes in general, comets, and ſeveral other phænomena, are inexplicable myſteries to the moſt penetrating philoſophical genius: but muſt they, or the inexplorable cauſe of any other phænomena, be ſupernatural and miraculous, merely becauſe they are incomprehenſible myſteries to the human mind? To apply this to the ſubject in queſtion, to which it bears ſome analogy: —We can account for ſome ideal phænomena in the intellectual or moral

moral world. We perceive that certain ſenſations and ideas are occaſioned by certain known cauſes, whilſt many of the ſecondary cauſes of others are unaccountable to us upon any ſettled and invariable laws, as well as many phænomena in the natural world: But may not ſuch ſenſations and ideas, whoſe cauſes we cannot explore, be as *naturally* produced in us, as others that are within the limits of the the underſtanding to diſcover?—We perceive that certain bodies attract others, and gravitate to a common center; but the *cauſes* of that attraction, or gravitation, is an inſcrutable ſecret: they are properties and affections of matter, which the Deity has endued it with. The *primary* cauſe of *gravity*, *motion*, *attraction*, or *repulſion*, which occaſions the diverſified phænomena of nature, is, indeed, *ſupernatural*. It is the Deity, and he is alſo, in one ſenſe, the primary cauſe of the powers and phænomena in the intellectual or moral world: but I cannot conceive the diſtinction between *natural* and *ſupernatural* ideas. ——What reaſon have we whereon to reſt the preſumption, that ſome ideas, and ſenſations, are *naturally*, and others *ſupernaturally*, excited? The people who hold the doctrine of ſupernatural ideas, *&c.* do not attribute every one that occurs, whoſe cauſe they cannot trace, to a ſupernatural agent; but they claſs them under three heads. 1ſt, Some are ſuppoſed to be produced by natural cauſes, according to the general laws of matter acting on the organs of ſenſe, though they may not be able preciſely to aſcertain the particular cauſes of ſome of them. 2dly, That ſome are excited in us by the action or influence of a diabolical ſpirit upon the human mind. 3dly, That others are produced by the immediate influence and inſpiration of the Deity. But, by what "*primary* and *ade-*

"*quate*

" *quate rule*" do they thus divide their ideas and ſenſations, as they declare that *human reaſon* is incapable of any preciſe judgement in the caſe?— but muſt not that, which diſtinguiſhes the good principle from the evil one, be ſomething diſtinct from both?

I am acquainted with many gentlemen amongſt the Quakers, and others, who hold the doctrine of immediate revelation; and have repeatedly urged the difficulties which attend the hypotheſis; but I could never acquire a ſatisfactory anſwer;— and, indeed, moſt of the more judicious part of the ſociety pretend no more to this " *infallible* " *criterion*," than the clergy do to the *divine right of tithes*; but it has been urged, that they are to be diſtinctly known by their tendency; by increaſing our love and gratitude towards the ſupreme Being, and inclining us to a ſteady obſervance of *good works*;— but this cannot be allowed to be the proper teſt: The *good-works*, among even theſe ſuper-rationaliſts, are very different, and ſometimes directly oppoſite or contrary. The *Good works* of ſome people are called *diabolical*, and " *abominable idolatry*" † by others. I ſhall leave it with them farther to conſider, by what means the human mind (whoſe reaſon is ſaid to be ſufficient) can diſtinguiſh the *influences* and *revelations*, *immediately* made by the Deity, from all other *influences* and *ideas mediately* revealed, whoſe ſecondary cauſes are known, from others that occur, ſeemingly adventitious, and thoſe that are produced and excited by any *diabolical agent*.

Mr. Barclay, p. 2, Apology, ſays, " *I have* " *followed the certain rule of the divine light and of* " *the holy ſcriptures*;" but did he prove *firſt* that *he had this infallible criterion in his own poſſeſſion?*

† See Barclay's prop. on worſhip.

Mr. Phipps denies the doctrine of *abſolute neceſſity*, while I think he urges ſome of the ſtrongeſt arguments for it, as I ſhall attempt to evince from his own words; but, previous thereto, let me tranſcribe ſome thoughts upon that ſubject from the *author of Cato's Letters*: "All or moſt of the "ſects of philoſophers, in *Greece* and *Rome*, held "fate or neceſſity; as the ſeveral ſects among the "*Jews* did, except the *Eſſenes*, a very ſmall ſect "indeed, not exceeding ſome few thouſands. "The Mahometans, through the world, hold "predeſtination. The *Calviniſts*, and ſome other "Proteſtant ſects, hold it now; and I do not un-"derſtand the articles of the church of England, "if it be not the orthodox opinion amongſt "us."

"The queſtion is not, whether a man can do "what he has a mind to do? but whether he can "do what he has no mind to do?"

"I do not ſee a greater abſurdity can be put "together in words, than that one being ſhall "make another; create the matter of which it "was made; give it all the faculties that it has; "all its capacities of reaſoning, powers of action, "means of thinking, and preſent it with all its "objects for thinking, yet leave it at liberty to "act againſt them all; which, I conceive, is a "down right impoſſibility. A pair of ſcales, per-"fectly poiſed, cannot ponderate on either ſide; "and a man, who has no motives to act, will not "act at all. Every thing muſt be at reſt which "has no force to impel it: But as the laſt ſtraw "breaks the horſe's back, or a ſingle ſand will "turn the beam of ſcales which holds weights as "heavy as the world, ſo, without doubt, as mi-"nute cauſes may determine the actions of men,

"which

" which neither others, nor they themſelves, are
" ſenſible of.— It is nothing to the purpoſe to ſay
" their choice determines them, if ſomething elſe
" muſt determine that choice: for, let it be what
" it will, the effect muſt be neceſſary. To ſay,
" that a man has power to act, without any mo-
" tives or impulſe to act, ſeems to me a direct
" blunder. A man cannot have a will to act
" againſt his will; and if he has a will to do it,
" ſomething muſt determine that will. It is ri-
" diculous to ſay, that though the mind has a
" principle of ſelf-motion, yet other cauſes co-
" operate to produce the action; for if any other
" cauſe makes it do what it would not otherwiſe
" do, that is the cauſe of the action produced to
" all the purpoſes of this argument. — What
" can be more evident than that the actions of
" men, which ſeem moſt ſpontaneous and free,
" depend upon his will to do them; and that
" that will is directed by his reaſoning faculties,
" which depend again upon the good or ill orga-
" nization of his body, upon his complexion, the
" nature of his education, imbibed prejudices,
" ſtate of health, predominant paſſions, manner
" of life, fortuitous reaſonings with others, dif-
" ferent kinds of diet, and upon the thouſands
" of events, ſeeming accidents, and the objects
" which perpetually encompaſs him, and which
" every day offer themſelves differently to him:
" all, or moſt, of which cauſes, and many more
" which probably determine him, muſt be con-
" feſſed to be out of his power. Conſtant expe-
" rience ſhews us, that men, differently conſti-
" tuted, or differently educated, will reaſon dif-
" ferently; and the ſame men in different cir-
" cumſtances. A man will have different ſenti-

" ments about the ſame things, in youth, in " middle age, and in dotage, in ſickneſs and in " health, in liquor and ſobriety, in wealth and in " poverty, in power and out of it; and the fa- " culties of the mind are viſibly altered by phy- " ſic, exerciſe, or diet." *Theſe are the ſentiments of the author of Cato's Letters.*

Let it not be thought that I hold the doctrine of *partial election*, or that God, by his *abſolute decree*, has damned, to all eternity, *any* of his creatures; — I abhor the thought, and could ſooner admit that he decreed the *final* happineſs of *all*: — But I ſhall proceed to ſhew, that as *unworthy* and *dreadful* doctrines may be fairly inferred from ſome of Mr. Phipps's poſitions, as from Mr. *Newton's*, or any *Calviniſt's*: alſo that ſome others eſtabliſh, as much as arguments can eſtabliſh, the doctrine of UNIVERSAL REDEMPTION.

P. 1. " *In the beginning God created all things* " *good. Inherently and immutably good himſelf,* " *every production of his muſt neceſſarily be* ſo, *ac-* " *cording to the ſeveral kinds wherein he created* " *them.*" Does Mr. Phipps's ſo mean *immutably* and inherently good? if ſo, I ſtumble at the very threſhold of his edifice: — but can any being, *neceſſarily good*, become *accidentally* evil? Does not the nature of any being neceſſarily determine its properties while identity remains? " *Man's ſoul* (p. 2, he ſays,) *was in ſubjection only* " *to the guidance of its Creator.*" If it was in ſubjection *only* to the guidance of its Creator, how could it be *ſubject* to the deluſion and guidance of the *ſerpent* or *devil?* †

P.

† An apoſtle tells us, that " *the creature was made ſubject to* " *vanity.*" Rom. viii. 20. But St. Paul ſays, " *Adam was* " *not deceived; but the woman being deceived was in the tranſ-* " *greſſion.*" 1 Tim. ii. 14.

P. 3. "*As the omniſcient Creator moſt certainly* "*foreſaw what a ſubtle adverſary men would have* "*to encounter, he as ſurely furniſhed means* SUFFI-"CIENT *to diſcover his ſnares, and reſiſt his aſſaults.* "*If Satan was ſuffered to uſe his ſubtlety and in-*"*fluence to deceive him, doubtleſs he was not only* "*warned, but alſo endued, with a ſufficiency of di-*"*vine light and influence, to withſtand his attempts,* "*as he kept duly upon his* WATCH." *Hence* it appears, that, for want of due *watchfulneſs*, Adam was deceived and ſeduced. A queſtion then ariſes, Why did he not keep up his watch? He wanted an *inclination* or *will* to *watch*. Could thoſe means, then, be *ſufficient*, which were not *ſufficient* to produce that inclination or volition to *watch?*

P. 3. "*Adam was firſt created a* natural man, "*and then rendered a* ſpiritual *one by the quick-*"*ening power of the Spirit of Chriſt, which is* "*the true life and proper element for immortal* "*ſpirits to live and move in.*"—— *Hence* it appears, Adam, when he was firſt created, was not placed in his *proper* element; he was created *one* thing, and then made *another*; not made what he was deſigned to be at *firſt*. A new creation or birth took place, even before his fall, and he was made a ſpiritual man.—Does the book of Geneſis contain this doctrine? It is remarkable, that in the four goſpels I have not found the names of Adam and Eve, of the fall of man, or angels: but I do not urge this as a *proof* that there were no ſuch perſons as Adam and Eve, or that the fall of man or angels have no foundation.

P. 4. "*Thus the parents of mankind, in their ori-*"*ginal uncorrupted ſtate, being fit temples for the* "*Holy Ghoſt to dwell in, were partakers of the divine* "*nature.*" If man's heart, then, was poſſeſſed by the Holy Spirit, and made partaker of the divine nature,

nature, was the *influence of the unholy ſpirit* ſtronger than that of the *Holy One?* or the *diabolical nature* than the *divine nature?* that it got into the heart, deceived it, corrupted its principles, and excited an evil inclination?— Did the Holy Ghoſt retire, and give place to the ſeducer, in order to try Adam by ſuffering him to be tempted? If ſo, it is no wonder he fell, for, in the abſence of the Holy Ghoſt, he had no power to reſiſt.

" *The conſequences of this primary lapſe were, im-*
" *mediately, affecting to the actual tranſgreſſors, and,*
" *remotely, to all their poſterity.*"—Hence it appears, that the *wages of ſin*, to wit, *death*, which Adam brought upon himſelf through *actual* tranſgreſſion, are paid to his poſterity previous to their *actual* tranſgreſſions, and the puniſhment or affliction, *due to ſin*, inflicted on the *innocent:* and yet he ſays there is no immediate connection betwixt the immortal ſpirit of Adam, which he ſays is properly the man, and the immortal ſpirit of his poſterity; for, he ſays, Adam did not generate ſouls, (ſee p. 13.) I know not what Mr. Phipps may be able to do, but I cannot reconcile theſe notions with the divine attributes, better than others have done the doctrine of original ſin; they appear to me equally perplexed and obſcure.

P. 4. " *It was, doubtleſs, in the light of this pure*
" *influence, that Adam had ſuch an* INTUITIVE *diſ-*
" *cerning of the creation, as enabled him to give names*
" *to them according to their ſeveral* NATURES."† This appears

† G. Fox, (p. 16, Journal,) ſays, " *I was come up to the*
" *ſtate of Adam before the fall, the creation was opened to me;*
" *and it was ſhewn to me how all things had their names given*
" *them, according to their nature and virtue. I was at a ſtand,*
" *in my mind, whether I ſhould practiſe phyſic for the good of man-*
" *kind, ſeeing the nature of creatures was ſo opened to me by the*
" *Lord.*" Neither Moſes, Aaron, Joſhua, the patriarchs, the prophets;

appears to me an unwarrantable preſumption;—we are not told, in the ſcriptures, that Adam had an *intuitive diſcerning of the creation*, or that he ſaw into the real eſſences of bodies. If Adam articulated certain ſounds to diſtinguiſh the ſeveral ſpecies, could there be any real analogy between thoſe ſounds and the natures of thoſe ſpecies? The text ſays, that the beaſts and fowls were brought before Adam, "*and whatſoever Adam called every living* "*creature, that was the name thereof*;" and not that the names were *according* to, or expreſſive of, *their ſeveral natures*. *Moſes*, who, it is ſaid, wrote the book of Geneſis, ſays nothing of Adam's *wiſdom*, though he does of the *ſerpent's*; nor does it *appear*, in that *book*, that Adam knew his own nature, or the nature of his Maker's, or that he enjoyed a ſpiritual communication with him: we are told, indeed, of verbal converſation that paſſed between them in the garden, but not a ſyllable of inward communication in the ſoul; neither does it *appear* that he had any idea of the *ſpirituality*, *ubiquity*, or *omniſcience*, of God, either before or after his fall, for he attempted to hide himſelf from his preſence; and, with all the wiſdom which Adam is ſaid to have poſſeſſed, the ſerpent *outwitted* him. Adam's happineſs, as well as wiſdom, is ſaid to have been entire before the fall; but ſome people

prophets; David, a man after God's own heart; Enoch, that was tranſlated and ſaw not death; Elijah, that was taken up to heaven in a fiery chariot; Job, a perfect man; nor any of the apoſtles, who wrought miracles and had the gift of tongues; pretended to have attained this ſtate or this knowledge. I cannot prove that G. Fox's teſtimony of himſelf is falſe, yet I cannot believe it, nor do I think one quaker in a thouſand can. However, if he had this knowledge, he might ſurely have given proofs of it by practiſing phyſic, thereby ſtopping the mouths of gainſayers, and at once have been the inſtrument of curing diſtempered bodies and depraved ſouls; but he was, it ſeems, *at a ſtand*, even in paradiſe.

people think, if his happineſs had been complete or entire, he could not have been capable of a motive to tranſgreſs; a *deſire* of any thing, which a perſon does not poſſeſs, implies ſome uneaſineſs or diſcontent.

It is plain that Adam was rendered unhappy, in a degree, before he tranſgreſſed, the fruit of the tree exciting a deſire in him to taſte of it, and the ſerpent's cunning addreſs determined his *will* to eat of it. And Mr. Phipps ſays, "*the degeneracy* "*lies in the cauſe of the will*," ſee p. 78, Obſervations. Some men cannot comprehend how Adam could be guilty of ſin, before his *eyes were opened*, to know *good* and *evil*, or diſtinguiſh *evil* from *good*, any more than an infant; for can it be ſaid that he ſinned with his eyes open? Others think that it is the property of ſin to ſhut mens eyes, rather than open them, and to render men more *fooliſh*, inſtead of *wiſer*.

P 6. Mr. Phipps ſays, "*the Omniſcient knows* "*both good and evil*;"— but Adam did not know *evil* till after his fall; did not he then commit it before he knew what it was? but, before his eyes were opened, and he knew evil, "*he was created* "*in the image of God*;" and, as ſoon as he knew both *good* and *evil*, it ſeems, he loſt that *image*:— *is not this myſterious!*

P. 5. "*Had their lapſe been through his will, or* "*intentional diſpoſition of circumſtances, ſo that it* "*muſt inevitably follow; he could not*, CONSIS- "TENTLY, *have ſentenced them to puniſhment for it*; "*becauſe, in ſo doing, they performed his will, which* "*could not be a ſin againſt him.*" I will not preſume to determine what God *can*, or cannot, *conſiſtently*, do. God is wiſe, but I am a fool;—but alter the word *puniſhment*, to *affliction*, and will it then appear *inconſiſtent?* Children, who have not actually

actually ſinned, feel the evil of *affliction* or *pain*; and, Mr. *Phipps* ſays, are ſo affected by Adam's tranſgreſſion, as to ſtand in need of the "*propi-*" *tiation of Chriſt*," as well as *adults*, who have actually ſinned; does this *appear conſiſtent?* Animals, inferior to man, feel the evil of *pain* or *affliction*, who are incapable of *ſin*. Are not the laws of their reſpective natures the laws which God conſtituted? Did not the *divine will* conſtruct thoſe laws, and cauſe ſuch a "*diſpoſition* "*of circumſtances*," that the evil of *pain* or *affliction* neceſſarily follows to animals who *perform his will?* Does this *appear* conſiſtent? Will any one preſume to ſay, that God acts "*inconſiſtently*," or that he is wanting in *wiſdom* and *goodneſs* in *afflicting* beings who are incapable of merit or demerit? Or muſt we charge God, fooliſhly, while we attempt to inveſtigate the cauſes of phænomena, where *wiſdom* and *goodneſs* do not *appear* to our feeble intellects? Through a diſpoſition of natural circumſtances, or cauſes, which men cannot foreſee or prevent, ſome of the moſt pious men, as well as, ſome of the moſt impious, have gone mad, and night and day, *neceſſarily* uttered all kinds of blaſphemy againſt their Maker. Does this *appear* conſiſtent? It does not *appear* to us that lunatics can contribute to the glory of God; and yet the *wiſdom* and *will* of God have thought proper to deprive ſome of his creatures of reaſon, and others of ſight, who attempted to make the beſt uſe of both; while theſe bleſſings have been continued to others, who perverted them to the worſt purpoſes. Does this appear conſiſtent? † God cannot do wrong: there let us ſtop; if we proceed farther, and pretend to determine what God can

† *Pain* is an *evil*, whether it be called *puniſhment* or not.

or cannot do, it were to ſet up human wiſdom as a judge of divine.

The lapſe of man is grounded on the lapſe of angels; and the lapſe of angels on whom? If they were created perfect, how came they to be capable of an evil inclination? *Without them* there was no *evil* to excite an evil inclination; no *tree*, *whoſe fruit was pleaſant*; no *ſerpent*; no *devil*: a *deſire* of more, of "*ſomething unpoſſeſſed*," interrupted their happineſs. But, if that be admitted, then their happineſs, even in heaven, was not complete; they had ſome "*aching void*" in their ſouls. *I ſhall not preſume to decide on theſe abſtruſe ſubjects.* The farther the human mind goes, in the enquiry after the *origin of evil*, the more it is perplexed.

P. 6, he ſays, "*The will of man, ſeparated from* "*the will of God, became* SELF-WILL." Might he not have ſaid as properly the *devil's will?* Can the will originate itſelf? ‡ Can the will be the cauſe of itſelf? Were it not as impoſſible as for a thing to act before it *exiſts*, and to give itſelf an exiſtence? Was not the *firſt* inclination or *will*, in Adam, to evil, an *effect* before it was a *cauſe?* and did not this *will* ariſe from an *inherent* imperfection in his nature, or from ſome cauſe, *ab extra?*

P. 7. "*Self-love, in man, was originally and pro-* "*perly placed in ſubſervience to the love of his Maker*; "and this love turned afterwards *from his Maker to* "*himſelf*." How came this revolution in the "kingdom of the human mind," that the love of the ſupreme Being, which had been *uppermoſt*, became *undermoſt*, and *God* rivalled by a *creature?* This

‡ P. 77, Obſervations, Mr. Phipps will not allow that the will is a "*ſeparate faculty*," but the determination of the paſſions, or the *determination of the power that predominates*; conſequently, when the devil's power or evil inclinations predominate, man's will muſt neceſſarily be evil: and this is the caſe of man in the fall.

This improper or inordinate love muſt have had ſome object capable of exciting it. Let us not confound the *paſſion* with its *object*, or the *effect* with its *cauſe*, but let us confeſs our ignorance.

P. 7. "*This mental ſeparation opened an eaſy road "of acceſs for the evil ſpirit to influence the human "mind towards exterior objects, and rendered them "the ſubjects of temptation.*" Here we are told, if I underſtand Mr. Phipps, of a mental ſeparation, even previous to temptation, conſequently, previous to the conception of evil, or an evil inclination; for that conception, or evil inclination, ſuppoſes a previous temptation, or cauſe: but how could there be ſuch a ſeparation, betwixt God and the creature, before a conception of evil? Is it not to place the *effect* before the *cauſe?* And if, as Mr. Phipps (p. 10) ſays, the ſoul "*comes into the world endued "with that divine life which Adam fell from,*" are not its conſequent actual tranſgreſſions, or ſenſual indulgencies, unavoidable? †

P. 9. "*Previous to our own actual offences, we "are all naturally affected by the tranſgreſſion of our "primogenitors.*" Are not *ſin* and *death*, or the evil of ſin, and the evil of puniſhment, two relatives that infer each other? Does not the doctrine of original or imputed ſin ſtare Mr. Phipps in the

 face?

† Obſervations, p. 79, Mr. Phipps ſays, if the grace of God does not ſave men the "cauſe is not in the grace, but in "themſelves:" but if it be in themſelves, how can they help it? *their natural element is corruption*; their fallen diſtempered nature is too powerful for the *grace* adminiſtered: the grace, then, as a cauſe, is not equal to produce the effect, and therefore proves inſufficient; for, if the good influence does not counteract or counterbalance the evil diſpoſition in the ſubject, its influence is not ſuperior to it, and the means are not adapted to the end. If a doſe of phyſic is given to a diſtempered body, and it does not operate as deſigned, and the cauſe of it be in the body yet, it cannot be ſaid that the medicine was ſufficient to produce the effect.

face? If, *previous* to *actual* offence, we are affected by Adam's ſin, are we not treated, in a degree, as *offenders?* And yet Mr. Phipps aſks, "with "what propriety can an infant, incapable of com- "mitting any *crime*, be treated as an *offender?* If infants feel any of the evils conſequent on, or due to, the actual tranſgreſſion of another, before they are capable of committing any crime, are they not treated as offenders?

P. 10, he ſays, "*His* (i. e. *God's*) *mercy and the* "*extent of his propitiation are as applicable to infants,* "*who have not perſonally offended, as to adults, who* "*have.*" Let me aſk Mr. Phipps, are the mercy of God and the propitiation of Chriſt at all applicable to thoſe who have not *perſonally offended*; or to INFANTS, whom he calls innocent? Can thoſe who have not ſinned be the objects of *mercy*, or ſtand in need of the *propitiatory ſacrifice of Chriſt*, which is to ſave *ſinners* from the puniſhment *due to ſin*, as well as from ſin? Where ſin has not been *committed*, or *imputed*, can a *propitiatory ſacrifice* be applicable at all?

P. 11, he ſays, "*The unrulineſs, intemperature,* "*and inordinate properties, in children, as well as in* "*men, are not to be radically ſubdued and ruled with-* "*out the application of a ſuperior principle.*" Does Mr. Phipps know a perſon in whom theſe evils are *radically* ſubdued? Has he heard of any man, who pretended this *radical* cure, whom mankind have not conſidered as a *knave* or *fool?* Mr. Barclay did not profeſs that he had attained this radical cure; and Mr. Phipps knows himſelf too well to pretend to it. The apoſtle, writing under inſpiration, ſpeaking in the *preſent* tenſe, calls himſelf the "*chief of ſinners,*" and "*leſs than the leaſt of all* "*ſaints;*" and yet ſays, that he had "*lived in* "*all good conſcience, before God, until this day.*" But

I confeſs

I confeſs the apoſtle ſpeaks abſtruſely, and is hard to be underſtood, in more places than one. In the ſame page, Mr. Phipps ſays, " *It is certain that* " *their progeny does not come into the world in that* " *ſame ſtate of brightneſs themſelves were conſtituted* " *in after their creation.*. Here Mr. Phipps talks of certainty about matters, of which, I preſume, he cannot be certain; but hence we may infer, that Adam's conſtitution, previous to his fall, was changed; for, it ſeems, his *created* (which may be properly called his *natural)* conſtitution, was not ſo bright as the conſtitution afterwards given him.

P. 12. " *In the preſent ſtate of our nature, the* " *ſenſitive power takes the lead of the rational in the* " *firſt ſtage of life.*" And yet, it ſeems, in this firſt ſtage, we are *innocent* and *incapable of ſin.* Is not man, then, *neceſſarily* ſubjected to be miſled by his ſenſitive powers? Who is the author of thoſe powers? Who conſtituted or appointed them? Does God or the devil govern ſenſitive nature? Are there powers in nature which were not derived from God? If his will or deſign is defeated, muſt it not be by ſomething *ab extra*; and is there any thing *ab extra* that was not created by him? or has he given a power to any of his creatures to thwart his own *will*, and counteract his own *purpoſe*, which is too high and too deep for human inveſtigation.

P. 13, he ſays, the rational ſoul " *deſcends not,* " *with the body, from parents to children.*" Whence it may be inferred, that the rational ſoul pre-exiſted in a perfect uncorrupt ſtate; and if, immediately upon its junction with the body prepared for it, it became corrupted, or affected by Adam's prior actual tranſgreſſion, the *ſeed* of ſin, which communicated the *taint* to the rational ſoul, muſt be a *corporeal ſubſtance*, which exiſted in the animal body

previous

previous to its *junction* with the ſoul; for, on this junction, the ſoul became affected by the laws and motion of matter. And it may alſo be inferred, from Mr. Phipps's premiſſes, that the animal fœtus, begotten by the *wickedeſt* parent in the *wickedeſt* manner, would poſſeſs the greateſt quantity of this *ſeed of ſin*; and that the rational ſoul, joined to it, would, of courſe, be the moſt *corrupted* by it; but we do not find that *baſtards* are naturally more vile than other children. Were people to reflect, that, when they have once eſtabliſhed their premiſſes, all natural inferences from them are eſtabliſhed alſo, they would be more wary in advancing poſitions, till they had traced them through their remoteſt neceſſary conſequences. For my part, I pretend no more to know how the animal fœtus is generated, than how the rational ſoul is created, or whether the ſoul is derived from parents or immediately from God; or than I know how any modification of matter can excite ſenſations and ideas in the mind, body act upon ſpirit, or ſpirit upon body. God is my father, he made me, knows my frame, remembers that I am duſt, and will not be offended that I know not what he has not given me *faculties* to comprehend; which, weak as they are, I humbly thank him for, and deſire to uſe them as he deſigned they ſhould be uſed.

P. 13. "*To account a child guilty, or obnoxious* "*to puniſhment, merely for an offence committed by* "*its parents, before it could have any conſciouſneſs of* "*being, is inconſiſtent both with juſtice and mercy;* "*therefore no infant can be born with guilt upon his* "*head.*" But I think, according to Mr. Phipps's doctrine, infants have the evil, which neceſſarily followed Adam's guilt, upon their heads; for he ſays they are affected by his actual tranſgreſſion, and that they are "*naturally* alienated from the in-

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" ternal life of God ;" which was the conſequence of ſin, and did not precede it, in our primogenitors.

P. 15. " *Nay, even the high rewards promiſed* " *to virtue and a good life, and the ſore puniſhment* " *annexed to vice and folly, are altogether inſuffi-* " *cient to retain them in the practice of the former, or* " *to enable them to conquer the force of their inclina-* " *tions to the latter.*" Is not this acknowledging what he has denied, p. 13, to wit, that the adverſary's power or influence over man is greater than God's? And though, as Mr. Phipps ſays, the goſpel, which contains theſe doctrines, is preached " *in every creature under heaven,*" yet a great number of creatures under heaven have not their *evil inclinations* changed for *good ones:* What is the cauſe? They cannot be virtuous, Mr. Phipps allows, without *inclination*; and can any man give himſelf this *inclination?* While his *inclinations* are towards evil, does he not neceſſarily commit evil? And, when they are changed to good, does he not as neceſſarily do good? I include here the intention of doing good, which may be called a mental action; as the man, " *who luſts after a woman,*" is ſaid " *to commit adultery with her in his heart.*" While a man poſſeſſes evil inclinations and volitions, as Mr. Phipps ſays, p. 16, " *a power too ſtrong,* " *for man has got poſſeſſion, and it muſt be a ſuperior* " *power to diſpoſſeſs him, to reſcue and reſtore man.*" And Mr. Phipps aſks, " *Who is ſufficient for theſe* " *things?*" He anſwers, *None but his omnipotent Creator was able to bind and extricate him.* And, in p. 17, he ſays, God is both *ready* and *willing* to do it. Is it not ſaid, in the ſcriptures, that we are in God's hands, as " *clay in the hands of the potter?*" And are we not told, *that God changes the heart of a man as a man turneth his water-courſe in the field?*

ſield? Can any thing here be meant by the *heart*, but the *affections*, *inclinations*, and *volitions*, of his creatures? The changing of their views, deſires, hopes, and expectations?—I aſk, but I will not determine.—And does he not ſay, p. 17, "*that* "*man ſhould, of himſelf, empower himſelf to live in* "*the conſtant practice of croſſing his natural inclina-* "*tions and propenſities, is a wild preſumption; but* "*that a Spirit infinitely good, and more powerful than* "*all his enemies*†, *ſhould, ſo* INFLUENCE, INCLINE, "*and enable, him, is highly reaſonable to believe, be-* "*cauſe* ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY." And does he not allow, p. 48, that "the new birth is the work "of the Holy Spirit *only?*" And what is a *new birth* but a change of *inclinations* and *volitions*, which are the ſecondary cauſes of good works? And does he not agree, p. 91, that the very paſſiveneſs, which he calls the firſt ſtep, man is "*previouſly* "*diſpoſed to by virtue of the Holy Spirit.*" What can be meant by this "*previous diſpoſition*," but the exciting a *volition* to *paſſiveneſs?* And is not every ſucceſſive volition to *activity* produced by the ſame cauſe? If the *firſt* ſtep be attributed to the power and goodneſs of God only, are any following ones *partly* taken by *man*, and *partly* by *God*; or can a *contingent* event mix with, or follow from, a *neceſſary* cauſe?

P. 15. "*The origin of evil in man came by tranſ-* "*ferring his attention and deſire from his Creator to* "*the creature, dividing the will from the will of* "*God.*" This is a brief account of the origin of evil,

† Has he any greater *enemies* than thoſe of his own *houſe*, his *luſts*, *inclinations*, and *volitions?* and theſe Mr. Phipps calls *natural*; and, if natural, *neceſſary*:—with what propriety, then, can Mr. Phipps ſay, that "*evil is no conſti-* "*tuent part of man?*" If he is *naturally fallen* and *alienated*, can evil be but "*an imperfection adventitious to his nature?*"

evil, but is it not too brief?—It is aſked how man's *will*, united primarily to the WILL of God, came originally to be transferred, *&c?* Could man's *firſt* evil inclination have been produced in man by a preceding good one in him? Or did this *will* produce itſelf? And man, in his fallen ſtate, having no good natural inclination, can he co-operate with the grace of God to produce one? Muſt it not be ſolely by the influence of God's Spirit? I do not pretend to account for the origin of evil; thoſe, who do, may miſtake its cauſe; thoſe who do not, cannot. I would not preſume to determine, preciſely, about the original cauſes of "*things that are too high for me*," while I cannot admit other beings, fallible as myſelf, to determine them for me: but it will, perhaps, be ſaid it is a "thing revealed in divers texts of ſcripture;" but this is not a proof of it; it is only your opinion of the ſenſe of thoſe texts; and if you have an infallible ſenſe of them, you ought to *prove* that you have the "*infallible criterion in your poſſeſſion.*" See p. 1.

P. 17. Mr. Phipps ſays, "*Phyſical evil has no "ſubſtantial exiſtence of its own:*" And that "*mo-"ral evil is no part of God's creation, nor has real "exiſtence of itſelf.*"—If the rational ſoul, previous to its junction with the body, was *pure*, and became, in the leaſt degree, *corrupted* or *defiled* by its *junction* with the body before *actual* tranſgreſſion, was not this principle of evil in the body, which defiled the ſoul, a real ſubſtantial exiſtence as a cauſe? But he goes on to evince, that moral evil "*is the fallen, defective, diſtempered, condition "of beings it once created without intemperature or "defect.*"—*But if an incapacity of doing* EVIL BE A PERFECTION, AS IN GOD, DOES NOT THAT CAPACITY IN INFERIOR BEINGS SUPPOSE A NATURAL

INHERENT DEFECT OR IMPERFECTION, *ab origine*, RATHER THAN AN IMPERFECTION ADVENTITIOUS TO THEIR NATURE?"

The wiſdom of God is diſplayed in adapting means to the end; the cauſe ſufficient to the effect †, as Mr. Phipps acknowledges, is *requiſite*, ſee p. 20. The heart of man, in his natural ſtate, is ſaid to be perverſe; its volitions, inclinations, and diſpoſitions, towards evil; and theſe are cauſes of evil actions: he cannot change them himſelf; and, till they are changed, to talk of his having *ſufficient means*, Mr. Newton, perhaps, may ſay, were to talk extravagantly; we judge of the means by the end, of the cauſe by the effect. All men, you ſay, have *ſufficient means*, but all do not apply them true; and what is the cauſe of the neglect of application? Can you find it any where but in the perverſe *nature*, *will*, *inclination*, and *diſpoſition*, of the ſubject? Can it apply the *ſufficient means*, without having a *ſufficient inclination* or *will* to apply them? And may not a man be as well *without means*, if he has no *inclination* or *volition* to apply them? Or can it be ſaid, that a man has the *means* of effecting any end, without he has a will to apply them to that end? And does not every poſſible action neceſſarily follow the *will* of the *agent?* Can a man ever act againſt his *preſent* will? Till he has a will to do any thing, is it not impoſſible that he ſhould do it? And that which

† According to Phipps's and Barclay's doctrine, if any of mankind are ſaved, muſt it not be by *coercive irreſiſtible* grace? For if the *will* and *inclinations* of man, in his fallen ſtate, are *continually evil*, in that ſtate can he *concur* with the *grace?* And muſt it not act, *forcibly*, contrary to his *will* and *inclinations*, which are *evil*, before they will be *ſubdued*, and *good ones* ſubſtituted?

which he wills to do will he not accompliſh, unleſs he is prevented by a foreign impediment?

P. 21. "*Perfect redemption conſiſts, firſt, in pay-*
"*ing the price of ranſom; and, ſecondly, in bringing*
"*out of bondage, and ſetting the priſoners at liberty.*
"*Our Saviour paid the firſt by his ſuffering and ſa-*
"*crifice; and he performs the laſt by the effectual*
"*operation of his Spirit in the hearts of thoſe who re-*
"*ceive him, and reſign wholly to him.*" Granted:—but can that operation of his Spirit, which does not produce a *volition* in the heart "*to receive and re-*
"*ſign wholly to him,*" be called an *effectual operation*, which does not prove *effectual*? Some mens *hearts*, that is to ſay, their *diſpoſitions*, *affections*, *inclinations*, and *volitions*, you grant are changed from bad to good by the grace of God, firſt rendering them *paſſive*, and then *active*. A Predeſtinarian would take an advantage here, and ſay, If this grace be given to *all men*, how comes it that *all men* are not firſt made *paſſive*, and then *active*? All men, you acknowledge, are equally, of themſelves, incapable of this *paſſivity* and *activity*. How comes it, then, that ſome are reduced to this *paſſivity*, this *firſt ſtep*, which muſt precede all the reſt? You may ſay, ſome men will not receive and ſubmit to *Chriſt in his inward manifeſtation*: ſtill the queſtion recurs, with its full force; Why have they not a *will* to *receive* and *ſubmit* to it?

P. 25. "*The vital part of man's religion and duty*
"*ſtands principally in a right attention to, and faith-*
"*ful obedience of, the manifeſtation of the Spirit of*
"*Chriſt in the heart and conſcience. He who pays*
"*due and conſtant regard to this, is, in his meaſure,*
"*a follower of Chriſt.*" The ſame difficulty occurs here: Some men want the *eſſential* requiſite, which it is not in their power to give themſelves, or, by any means, contribute to acquire, to wit,

a *will* and *inclination* to *attend* and *obey*; and, were it *poſſible* for them to *attend* and *obey*, contrary to their preſent will and inclination, they could not be *ſervants of Chriſt*; for, you ſay, "*Who is a ſer-*"*vant of Chriſt but he who* WILLINGLY *obeys* "*him?*"

P. 29. "*It is eſſential to us, who have the ſcrip-*"*tures, to believe both in the outward coming and* "*inward miniſtration of our Saviour.*" Do you mean that it is eſſential to us to have the right ſenſe of the doctrines contained in them? But who they are which have that ſenſe, perhaps, God only knows, while every ſociety profeſſes to have it. *Super-rational* profeſſors differ no leſs than mere *rationaliſts*.—If the ſcriptures are interpreted to our underſtandings, and we accept them in a wrong ſenſe, can it be ſaid that we believe in the ſcriptures at all? And might we not be as well, or better, without them, left to the mere dictates of reaſon and conſcience? For, if we are not informed by them, we may be miſled and confounded, by taking them in a wrong ſenſe. We ſee that mankind, either ignorantly or deſignedly, have put ſuch a ſenſe upon them, that they have been together by the ears theſe 1000 years, quarrelling, fighting, and curſing one another, about the favourite tenets, which different parties have drawn from them, and pretended were agreeable to the *Spirit* of God, as well as *right reaſon*.

In brief, have not the ſcriptures, placed on the rack of mens wit and invention, been made to confeſs, or deny, any thing that their torturers could deſire? And the proofs, which *ſome* high profeſſors bring of their right ſenſe, amount to no better, than the church of *Rome* brings for her authority and infallibility; to wit, the infallible church determines that the church is infallible: the church

deter-

determines, that ſhe has a right to determine; and their oppoſers, deemed their *adverſaries*, and the *Lord's adverſaries*, have been oftener confounded and ſilenced, than convinced.

P. 33. "*How ſhall man open to him*, (i. e. *Chriſt*,) "*and receive him?*" Anſwer: "*By reſigning his* "*attachment to ſelf, and the propenſities of ſenſe,* "*and humbly adhering to the voice, or preſent mani-*"*feſtations of the Spirit.*" Granted;— but till that *attachment to ſelf* is diſſolved, *and the propenſities of ſenſe are ſubdued*, by a foreign and ſuperior power to them, can he adhere to the *voice*, or *preſent manifeſtation of the Spirit?* And, when this is accompliſhed, can a man forbear adhering to the voice of the Spirit?— I do not deſire a *particular* anſwer to every one of my queſtions, as G. Fox†, in his *Primer*, did, reſpecting the origin of all the technical words and terms of the ſeveral ſciences, but I wiſh my readers may anſwer them ſatisfactorily to themſelves.

P. 35. "*Mankind are not left to Satan, nor to* "*their own luſts; nor to live without God in the* "*world. A way is caſt up; a means is provided.* "*Beſide the natural and traditional conſciouſneſs of* "*mere moral good and evil in every breaſt, God hath* "*a divine witneſs in the heart of each individual,* "*which will truly manifeſt right and wrong in the* "*conſciences of thoſe who faithfully attend there-*"*to; afford light and power to ſet them free from* "*the*

† *G. Fox*, in his *Primer* addreſſed to the *Univerſities*, has collected all the technical terms of the ſeveral ſciences, *grammar, logic, rhetoric, muſic, geography*, &c. and deſires to know *whom they came from?* "*Who was the author of every particular* "*word? What was its root?*" and queries whether they did not all come from the *devil?*— An explicit anſwer *to every one of his particulars* would have taken an age to anſwer, though it would have been "*more tedious than difficult.*"

" *the mists of prepossession and prejudice, and become* " *to them a safe conductor, and an able supporter,* " *in the paths of religion and virtue.*" Can a being who, Mr. Phipps acknowledges, p. 18, is naturally alienated from the source of good, and one whom Mr. Barclay says, (see the Proposition on the Fall of Man,) *is prone to evil, and whose thoughts are evil* CONTINUALLY; can such a being have *any* natural consciousness of *moral* good? Is there not a contradiction here!

If *sufficient light and power* are given to set all men free from the *mists of prejudice* and *prepossessions*, how comes it that all men are not freed from them? Has the *light* and *power*, in question, conquered the *prejudices* and *prepossessions* of the JEWS, TURKS, and HEATHENS, who oppose the Christian religion upon principle? How comes it that, in general, the descendants of JEWS, remain *Jews* still; TURKS, *Mahometans* still; the HEATHENS, *Idolaters* still; PAPISTS, *Papists* still; CALVINISTS, *Calvinists* still; and LUTHERANS, *Lutherans* still? And that there are as many *prejudices* and *prepossessions* in the world, and less charity, than before the coming of Christ? Will it be said, they do not faithfully attend to this *light* and *power*?— True, they have not an *inclination* or will to attend to it. " *In the day of* " *God's power, it is said, people are to be made wil-* " *ling.*" I pray God that day may overtake every soul in his creation. The causes of *ignorance* and *vice* are, *blindness*, *prepossessions*, and *prejudices*, with *evil inclinations, and natural evil propensities:* these a man cannot relinquish or change of himself; and, till they are removed, will not the necessary effects of them be produced?

P. 36. " *As sin wars against the Spirit to destroy* " *the soul, the Spirit wars against sin to save the* " *soul?*" Here Mr. Phipps gives us an idea of the

the conflict betwixt *light* and *darkneſs*, *good* and *evil*, *Chriſt* and *Belial*, in the little kingdom of the human mind. But is not the ſpirit of *Chriſt* equal to the ſpirit of *Belial*? Is not *Chriſt* ſtronger than the ſtrong man armed, *Belial*, that he cannot be diſpoſſeſſed of the human heart? Has he a greater power over the *inclinations* and *volitions* of God's creatures than the *Holy Spirit*, which is ſent from heaven to reſcue mankind from his dominion? In God's time, I hope ſin and death will be deſtroyed, and God be all in all.

P. 41, Mr. Phipps ſays, "*there is no medium* "*between ſelf-exiſtence and dependence on its cauſe*; "*therefore a ceſſation from it, of the power that made* "*it, is annihilation to it.*" Could Mr. Hobbes have aſſerted the doctrine of *neceſſity* in ſtronger terms? What is man's *will* but a peculiar modification of his mind? I think, if man's *will* be *free*, in Mr. Phipps's acceptation of the term, it can have no cauſe at all, but muſt be produced by *itſelf*; which is, I think, too palpable an abſurdity to be admitted. "*All created things*, ſays Mr. Phipps, *were* "*made, and* STILL SUBSIST, SOLELY *by the energy* "*of the* CREATOR'S WILL AND POWER, *he muſt*, "NECESSARILY, *whilſt they exiſt, be omnipreſent* "*with them, in them, and through them; therefore* "*he cannot be ignorant of any thing relating to them,* "*unconcerned about them, or any part of them.*" Is not that modification of the mind, called the *will*, a mode of its *ſubſiſtence*? If it be, on Mr. Phipps's principles, it is produced "*ſolely by the energy of* "*the Creator's will.*" In the ſame page, Mr. Phipps grants, that man is preſerved in innocence, and recovered from his fallen ſtate, by "*the Spirit of God* "*governing the effects of natural cauſes, to counteract* "*the wiles, and oppoſe the influences, of the evil ſpi-* "*rit.*" Are not evil inclinations the effects of

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natural cauſes, if man's "*natural element is corrup-*
"*tion?*" Mr. Phipps aſks, (p. 42,) "*Will not*
"*that which letts lett ſtill, till it be taken out of the*
"*way?*" Yes: and do not man's evil inclinations lett? and will they not lett, till a "*ſuperior*
"*power, which governs the effects of natural cauſes,*" takes them away, and ſubſtitutes better, by "*coun-*
"*teracting the wiles, and oppoſing the influences, of*
"*the evil ſpirit,*" "by the ſuperior *influences* of his *own good Spirit?* †

In p. 46, I think Mr. Phipps has ſhewn, in as clear a manner as any predeſtinarian could do in words, that God is the ſole author of the *will*, and that he *perfects* even the *deed*. What becomes, then, of *man*'s free-will? ——— Read the page.

P. 56. "*As light diſcovers all things, yet cannot*
"*be really known but by its appearance, ſo God, who,*
"*in the moſt perfect and ſuperlative ſenſe,* IS LIGHT,
"*can only be truly known by his own immediate mani-*
"*feſtations.*" This light, he ſays, is in *all* men; but can it be ſaid to be at all in thoſe whom it does not *illuminate?* Or can it be ſaid to morally *influence* any that are *inſenſible* of its *influence*; which all thoſe, Mr. Phipps ſays, that oppoſe it, demonſtrate they are?

P. 57, he ſays, "*By his vital influence he com-*
"*municates a living ſenſe of truth,* (i. e. *to the Mem-*
"*bers of Chriſt's church,*) INCLINES *them to himſelf,*
"*and inſpires them both with the* DESIRE *and* POWER
"*of obedience.*" ‡ Has his opponent, Mr. Newton,

† Spirit, in the ſcripture, applied to created beings, means no more, I preſume, in *ſeveral places*, than *diſpoſition, temper*, or a *peculiar modification of the mind*; as a *meek ſpirit*, a *turbulent ſpirit*, a *ſpirit of fear*, of *love, envy, jealouſy, revenge, mercy, juſtice*, a *good ſpirit*, an *evil ſpirit*.

‡ P. 80, Obſervations. Though the grace of God does not ſave all, yet, it ſeems, it has its "*proper effect on all*;" on certain

ton, ſaid more or leſs? But Mr. Newton may perhaps reply, has God inſpired all men with the *deſire* and *power* of obedience? can thoſe, thus inſpired, be *unfaithful?* and can thoſe, who want this inſpiration, be *faithful?* To aſk why all men are not thus *inclined* and *inſpired* with the *deſire* and *power* of obedience, might be as impertinent as the queſtion propoſed to Chriſt, "*Are there, then, few that be* "*ſaved?*" Luke xiii. 23.

P. 84. "*The ſheep follow him, for they know his* "*voice; and a ſtranger they will not follow: the* "*voice of Chriſt is the manifeſtation of his ſpirit to* "*the ſoul.*" And the manifeſtation of this ſpirit is ſaid to be given to *every man to profit withal*: how comes it, then, ſeeing *all* men have heard this voice, that ſo *few* follow it; while a great majority of mankind call it a *ſtrange voice*, an *ignis fatuus?* The *voice* has very different effects upon different ears; to ſome it is grateful, to others unpleaſant; to ſome it appears *wiſe*, to others *fooliſh*; while others proteſt they never heard it at all: muſt it not be owing to the *organ* of its communication, or to the *diſpoſition* of the ſoul? chuſe you whether. Wherever the defect lies, can any other influence than that of God's remove it? though, why he does not do it, and equally *incline* all men, and *inſpire* them with the *deſire* and *power* of obedience, it were *preſumption* in me to enquire. He is equally wiſe and good, when his wiſdom and goodneſs

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certain "*terms*, upon man." "*In whom it is accepted and* "*obeyed, it operates to ſalvation.*" What terms can fallen man make with his Maker till he is renewed? He cannot *will* to accept, much leſs to obey; and if *grace* does not produce this *will*, has it a *proper effect?* He ſays, (p. 82, Obſerv.) "*Man* "*cannot be good or evil at his option:*" the grace of God, he ſays, "*has its ſufficiency in itſelf.*" Can it, then, be ſaid not to prove effectual without the concurrence of the creature? If a medicine has ſufficiency in itſelf, and does not impart that ſufficiency to the body, can its operation be *effectual?*

are *not manifeſted* to our feeble intellects, as when they are. But can it be ſaid that a law is written in a man's heart, or has an exiſtence there, before it is *known, perceived*, or *manifeſted?* "*Let God be* "*true, and every man a liar.*" Perhaps all intelligent beings will, *ultimately*, be *effectually* influenced by his Spirit to ſalvation: this is what I cannot help praying for.

P. 88. "*Whoſoever deny that the Holy Spirit* "*and its internal operations are not now to be ſenſibly* "*experienced, only demonſtrate their own* INSENSIBI- "LITY *of it.*" Can the *Holy Spirit* be in the mind of any man, and not communicate to it a *ſenſibility* of its *preſence* or *operation?* If ſo, does it not either lie dormant, or act to no purpoſe? for, previous to a man's *profiting* by it, it is ſuppoſed he will be made *ſenſible* of it; and, previous to this *ſenſibility* in the heart, can it be ſaid to be *manifeſted* to it? Is it proper to talk of *manifeſtations* of the Spirit, which are not *manifeſted*, and the ſubject is *inſenſible* of it?

P. 93. "*Let Man but yield obedience to his con-* "*viction, and ſee if he can charge his Creator with* "*partiality or hard meaſures.*" But does not *conviction* imply *ſenſibility?* Can he give himſelf the *deſire*, much leſs the *power*, of obedience? Has not Mr. Phipps already allowed that God is the author of the *will* and the *deed?*

"*According to my apprehenſions, ſin conſiſts in the* "*creature's preferring the indulgence of its depraved* "*nature to the obedience of the divine grace.*" If it prefers *evil* to *good*, it ſuppoſes that an evil *inclination*, or *volition*, is the ground, or cauſe, of that *preference*; and can it change this of itſelf, without an inclination to change it? and can it give itſelf that inclination? A *ſuperior power only*, it ſeems, *who is capable of governing the effects of natu-*

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ral cauſes, and of counteracting the wiles, and oppoſing the influences, of the evil ſpirit, can change it; and, till that is done, will not the *cauſe* remain and the *effects* naturally follow? Will Mr. Phipps ſay, that deſirable work will never be accompliſhed?

P. 86, Obſervations, Mr. Phipps ſays, "*Though* "*man muſt eat or drink, or his body muſt neceſſarily* "*die, yet he is not the proper cauſe of his life and ſup-* "*port, but God, who gives him being, and alſo fur-* "*niſhes the food he eats, together with the power of* "*digeſtion: if God denies him either food or ability,* "*he cannot eat, nor, conſequently, live: it is the gift* "*of God, by which his body is ſuſtained; and the* "*power of partaking it is alſo God's gift.*" Here Mr. Phipps draws an analogy between *corporeal appetites* and *food*, and the *grace of God* and man's *will* or *appetite*, or power to *accept* and *apply it*. Could a *predeſtinarian* deſire a ſtronger argument to eſtabliſh his doctrine of *partial election?* Let us attend to what he might reply. God has given to all men a plenty of wholeſome food, but (for wiſe purpoſes, unknown to us) has not given all men an *appetite* for it, and a *power of digeſting* it, therefore they neceſſarily die: thus, God has given *grace to all men*, but not a *volition*, or *will*, to accept it, nor *faith* to *digeſt it*; and therefore ſome men are *neceſſarily* damned. What would Mr. Phipps reply? for they are ready with their "*Who* "*art thou that replieſt againſt God? Shall the formed* "*ſay unto him that formed it, why haſt thou made me* "*thus?*" What is the cauſe that ſome men do not *accept* the grace of God, though they ſtand in as much need of it, to be ſaved, as the body does of food, to maintain its life? They have not an *appetite*, or *will*, to receive its *manifeſtations*, to *accept it*, or *faith* to *digeſt it: food*, ſay they, is given in vain, if people have no *appetite* for it, nor

power of digeſting it. Moreover, *all men*, they ſay, have not *faith*, which is as much the *gift of God* as an *appetite*, or the *power of digeſtion*; and if God withholds it from them, or if his grace is not effectual to the producing of faith in, or creating a will to receive, it, men are as neceſſarily *damned*, as the body dies that is deſtitute of an *appetite for food*, or *a power of digeſting it.* I cannot conceive how Mr. Phipps could anſwer theſe arguments, on his hypotheſis; but that may be owing to the incapacity of my inferior abilities. It gives me ſome pain, to think that he has put ſuch ſeeming powerful arguments into the mouths of the *Calviniſts.* How came Mr. Phipps to ſay, (p. 97, Obſervations,) *That the natural ſtate of man, that of the fall, is, in itſelf, a ſtate of reprobation, though not the final one?* Here is *reprobation* without, or previous to, *actual ſin.* How can he deny original or *imputative ſin*, or *imputative righteouſneſs?* O! Mr. Phipps, what a falling away was here! How came he to ſay, (p. 98, Obſervations,) that, if the devil has power over our minds, we have power to grant it him? Does not the fallen reprobated ſtate of man, in the fall, before actual ſin, *neceſſarily* grant it him? From whom was the power, to abuſe the power given, derived? How can he ſay, after all this, that men have power to refuſe him, who have not refuſed him, nor have inclination to refuſe him? Can there be a *moral power* without a *volition* or *inclination* to refuſe him? and will he ſay that all men have this? or can any, who have a *will* to reſiſt him, forbear to reſiſt him? does the freedom of man conſiſt in acting *contrary to his will*, or *without any?*

P. 10, Obſervations, Mr. Phipps very laconically ſays, that, without guilt, there can be no miſery; and, without ſin, no guilt: but, it ſeems,

without

without guilt there may be reprobacy. He avows, that the *natural* ſtate of man, in the fall, is, in itſelf, a ſtate of reprobation, though not a final one. Can a being be in a reprobate ſtate without being in a miſerable ſtate? Is not "the element of cor-" ruption," which he ſays is man's natural ſtate, a miſerable one? Does not corruption or imperfection, applied to the rational ſoul, which, he ſays, is properly the man, imply miſery? and is not a degree of pain a degree of miſery? do not infants in the *very birth*, and after it, before they are capable of *actual* tranſgreſſion, *feel pain* or *miſery?* and do not brutes feel pain or miſery, who act according to God's *will*, and who cannot ſin? How can he reconcile theſe facts with his notions of God's *juſtice*, not to ſay *goodneſs?* Are not theſe things, as well as preſcience, amongſt the "*impenetrable* "*ſecrets which we cannot comprehend?*"

P. 102, Mr. Phipps ſays, "*If the Almighty,* "*from the beginning, ſo ordered his creation, that* "*evil muſt neceſſarily enſue in it, what worſe can be* "*ſaid of the worſt of beings, than this doctrine of the* "*beſt?*" This is not unanſwerable: An inherently malevolent or *worſt* being would inflict evil or pain for its own ſake, or on purpoſe to occaſion miſery; but the *beſt* of beings, who is inherently good and gracious, is juſtified in ſo ordering his creation, that evil or pain muſt neceſſarily enſue in it, if that evil be deſigned as the preparatory means of rendering his creatures ultimately capable of a greater degree of good, upon the whole, which could not be attained without the introduction of ſome degree of *evil* or *pain*, as the preparatory means to that end.† Whether intelligent

† The abſolute neceſſity of the end eſtabliſhes the neceſſity of the means to that end, though thoſe means may be diverſe.

ligent beings could have been ſo conſtituted, as to poſſeſs ſo much happineſs without being neceſſarily ſubjected to ſome degree of evil or pain, as they may ultimately be by being ſubjected neceſſarily to it, I will not determine: why the creation was not conſtituted better, is not for me to enquire. Cannot God be GOOD, or *conſiſtent*, if ſome of his diſpenſations are inſcrutable, or the *goodneſs* and *conſiſteney* of them "*not open to the* "*perception of our imperfect modicum of reaſon?*" See p. 117. Mr. Phipps can readily aſſert the divine preſcience, and yet the *conſiſteney* of it does not *appear* to him; for he ſays, (p. 118,) that it is "*an impenetrable ſecret to human underſtanding.*"

P. 103. "*It is impoſſible God ſhould commit any* "*act of ſin, becauſe it is againſt his nature; and,* "*conſequently, impoſſible that he ſhould will it.*" — And can man, or any other being, *will*, or *act*, contrary to his *nature?* If ſo, is he not capable of doing *more* than omnipotence itſelf can do? which were to exalt the *power* of a *created being* above the *power* of its *Creator*. To every ſpecies of being he has given laws agreeable to their nature: but were he to give any one a power of acting contrary to its nature, would it not be to give them a power *ſuperior* to his *own*, who can but act agreeably to his own *infinite* and *perfect* nature.

P. 105. "*There is a ſupreme all-powerful Con-* "*trouler of circumſtances and events, who can, and* "*unqueſtionably doth, in due ſeaſon, by his* POTEN-"TIAL *influence upon the mind of man, counterba-* "*lance every other influence.*" A *predeſtinarian* acknowledges the ſame: Mr. *Newton*, I preſume, will not deny it. This influence, ſome people ſay, takes place in the minds of the *elect*: but if this *potential influence* equally prevailed in *all* men, would

would not the evil *inclinations* and *diſpoſitions* of *all* be counterbalanced and controuled effectually, and *good* inclinations be produced? A man cannot poſſeſs *two different* inclinations, or volitions, at the ſame time: the *evil one* muſt be annihilated before the *good one* can take place; and perhaps, in "*due ſeaſon*," this may be accompliſhed by him who wants neither *will* nor *power* to reſtore his fallen creatures to an union with himſelf. See p. 17.

P. 103, Mr. Phipps ſays, that "*though he*, "(i. e. *God*) *forbore forcibly to hinder them* (his rea-"ſonable creatures) *from falling into iniquity, he did* "*all he could to prevent it in rational creatures.*" And in p. 118, he ſays, "*No juſt reaſon can be ad-*"*vanced, that he* (i. e. God) *ſhould deal ſo unequally* "*with them*, (i. e. his creatures,) *as to predetermine* "ſome *to eternal happineſs.*" But does not *Mr. Barclay allow*, (ſee Apol.) that God's grace operates in ſuch a manner, upon ſome, that they are not ſuffered to reſiſt it; as in the caſe of the *virgin Mary* and the *apoſtle Paul?* If this be granted, it appears, firſt, that a partial preterition to eternal life is not unworthy of God; and yet, if that be admitted, can it be ſaid that he deals equally with his reaſonable creatures? for, I preſume, thoſe, thus predetermined to happineſs, were *reaſonable creatures*. Secondly, that God does not forbear forcibly to ſave ſome rational creatures from ſin, whom he forbears forcibly hindering from falling into iniquity. Thirdly, that God ſuffered ſome of his creatures to fall into iniquity whom he had predetermined to eternal happineſs, for theſe had been ſinners. If this be admitted, and *we may be allowed* to reaſon from our *beſt ideas* of *moral equality*, might we not reaſonably infer, that all intelligent beings will, in *due ſeaſon*, be ſo wrought upon by his

his grace, as not to be ſuffered to reſiſt, and be ultimately ſaved? *I infer from the premiſſes of Barclay and Phipps.*

P 107, Mr. Phipps ſays, "*I am utterly unable* "*to conceive how* OPPOSITE WILLS *can ſubſiſt in the* "*ſame nature*;" whether a *human* or *divine* nature, that is to ſay, a *will* according to its nature, and a *will* contrary to its *nature*. People who attempt to diſtinguiſh betwixt *nature* and *art*, in human life, attempt to diſtinguiſh where I think there is no diſtinction, for *art* is *natural* to man.

P. 109. "*Then ſome feel the comfortable touches* "*of divine viſitation, inſtead of humbling themſelves* "*under it, that the work of regeneration may go for-*"*ward, this opinion leads them to imagine it to be a* "*mark of their election.*" Poor ſouls! according to this doctrine, if I apprehend it, we are never ſafe from deluſion, even under "*the comfort-*"*able touches of divine viſitation.*" When the *light* ſhines and we feel its comfortable influence, can we be deceived? What a powerful being this devil is, how mighty is his influence, that, even while the grace of God is operating *immediately* on the heart, he can find *immediate* acceſs to it to deceive it! And yet, it ſeems, (ſee p. 103,) "*God uſed* "*all fair means to prevent it.*" Can we ſuppoſe that God comes to any terms of agreement with the devil, in the mode of his oppoſing his influence over poor mortals?

Mr. Phipps profeſſes to poſſeſs a *meaſure* of the *infallible Spirit*, and attempts to try Mr. *Newton's* arguments by it, and the *true ſenſe of ſcripture*; but ſuppoſe Mr. *Newton*, in his turn, were to call upon him, and ſay, p. 124, "*he forgot that he* "*ought, in the firſt place, to prove, that he hath* "*this infallible criterion in poſſeſſion?*"

I muſt

I muſt ſay a little more on the ſubjects of natural and moral *evil*. *Pain* and *offence* are two relatives that infer each other both in the natural and moral world, and the *cauſe* of it is the *offending* cauſe; our bodies are ſo conſtituted, that the action of external bodies on them, excites, in the mind, different ſenſations of *pleaſure* and *pain*, in different degrees: the *natural* cauſes, that occaſion the *painful* ones, are called *offenſive*, to us, becauſe their operations offend us, that is to ſay, give us pain; for whatever gives us pain, neceſſarily offend us. Hence, that which gives us pain, which is an *evil*, is, verbally, or nominally, diſtinguiſhed from others by the term of *evil*; and thoſe whoſe operations upon us cauſe pleaſing ſenſations, and are ſalutary, we call *good*: thus *food* is *good*, becauſe it has nutritive and preſerving qualities, and arſenic *evil*, becauſe it is of a poiſonous deſtructive quality.—Such a diſpoſition of the blood and juices, in the corporeal ſyſtem, as produces *health*, and prevents *pain*, we call a *good* diſpoſition; and ſuch a different diſpoſition of the blood and juices as deſtroys *health*, and occaſions *pain*, we call an *evil* diſpoſition: the wind which blaſts our fruits, or that prevents us from making our port, we call an *ill wind*; that which cools us in ſultry weather, and carries us directly to our port, we call a *good wind*: the ſeaſon that is favourable to health, and to the ripening the fruits of the earth, we call a *good ſeaſon*; another that deſtroys our fruits, and is unfavourable to health, we call a *bad*, *evil*, or *ill*, *ſeaſon*. Thus every thing, in the natural world, that is ſerviceable to us, and that gives us *preſent pleaſure*, or excites the *hope* of *future pleaſure*, we call *good*; and every thing that is diſſerviceable to us, that gives us *preſent pain*, or excites a *fear* of *future pain*, we call *evil*; and, our bodies, be-

ing differently conſtituted, it happens, in innumerable inſtances, that what are *natural goods* to ſome people, are *natural evils* to others; and, *vice verſa*, *cheeſe* is pleaſant to the taſte, and agrees with ſome people, and is therefore *good* to them; but it is unpleaſant to the taſte, and often diſagrees with others, and is therefore an *evil* to them: Had the Deity ſo conſtituted us, and the natural world, that the action of bodies in it, upon our corporeal organs, could have produced only agreeable ſenſations, then every thing would have been deemed *good*, and there would have been no *natural evil* in the world; but God's wiſdom has conſtituted it, doubtleſs, for the beſt, though *natural evil* neceſſarily proceeds from that conſtitution.

So much for natural evil; and, as to moral evil, what ſhall we ſay? The original deſire, as well as every ſubſequent one, for any *abſent* or *foreign imaginary good*, produces *pain*, and this pain excites a *will*, and ſtimulates us to ſeek it.— We always, *neceſſarily*, ſeek a *ſuppoſed good*, and always attempt to remove from *pain* to *pleaſure*, or to get rid of *painful* or *evil* ſenſations, and procure *pleaſurable* or *good* ones; and if we ever, *voluntarily*, endure *pain*, it is never without a *hope* or *expectation*, that it will be productive of a future ſuperior *good*, or prevent ſtill *greater evil*. Man, naturally and neceſſarily, deſires and means to ſeek happineſs; it is impoſſible that he ſhould will *evil* as *evil* to himſelf, or, *purpoſely*, do any thing which he knows will produce it in himſelf; as, therefore, before ſuch an operation of matter, on the organs of ſenſe, in the *body* of the *firſt* created being that produced a painful ſenſation, there was no *natural evil in the world*, ſo, previous to the *firſt* evil, moral, mental, *inclination*, in the *firſt* created intelligent being

being of any ſuppoſed *abſent good*, (which muſt be attended with ſome degree of *pain* or *uneaſineſs*, which is itſelf a *moral evil*,) there was no moral evil in the intellectual or moral world†; and, as the *natural evil* of *bodily pain* was not produced by the *will* of the created being, who could not *will evil to himſelf*, he was not voluntarily the *author* or *cauſe* of that *moral evil*; and, ſuppoſe it were aſked, whether the firſt or laſt, or any other, intelligent created being, could be the *cauſe to itſelf* of that *firſt* inclination to, or deſire of, ſome *abſent* or ſuppoſed *foreign good*, which was attended with a degree of mental uneaſineſs, and introduced *moral evil*; did not this *moral evil* of *pain*, or *uneaſineſs*, exiſt in the mind *previous* to what is termed *actual tranſgreſſion?* And was it not the *cauſe* or *motive* of the volition which *cauſed* the ſubſequent *evil* of *actual tranſgreſſion?* If ſo, there was a ſpecies of *moral evil* in the world, *previous* to what is called the *evil of ſin*, which is the *tranſgreſſion of a law*, and that *evil* or mental *uneaſineſs* ſtimulated the *will* to act, which was but an effort of the the mind, to remove the *uneaſineſs* or *pain* which the inclination or paſſion occaſioned by gratifying it, or attempting to acquire that object which it deſired. God, doubtleſs, ſees throughout all the ſeries of cauſes and effects, (but we ſee through none of them, nor do we know the real eſſence of any thing in nature,) and, from the *whole*, an end will, doubtleſs, reſult worthy of infinite wiſdom and goodneſs, though we cannot ſee to that end, and may diſagree about it, as well as about the means of his *providence* and *moral government*.

† As to the abſtract fitneſs and unfitneſs of virtue and vice, it *appears* to me no better than abſtract nonſenſe, or *Ariſtotle's* occult qualities.

If God could, without working a *contradiction*, or *abſolute* impoſſibility, have created a ſyſtem from which all kinds of *evil*, which is *pain*, might have been excluded, did infinite wiſdom and goodneſs want a *motive* to do it? It is granted, that God cannot make a being equal to himſelf in *power*, *wiſdom*, and *goodneſs*; and whether he can *create* a being capable of an *uninterrupted happineſs*, or of being *perfectly happy* throughout the *whole* of its exiſtence: or whether only a *ſelf-ſufficient being* can be *perfectly* happy, or enjoy *uninterrupted happineſs* throughout the whole of its exiſtence: or whether, as God is *neceſſarily* perfect, and *neceſſarily* happy, becauſe he is *ſelf-ſufficient* and *independent*, all created beings muſt *neceſſarily* be unhappy in *ſome* degree, in order to be happy in *any* degree, becauſe they are not *ſelf-ſufficient*: or whether the natural neceſſary *inherent* imperfection of a *created being* is the *original* of *evil*, I will not preſume to determine.—But may not that *evil*, or *pain*, ſuppoſing it to be neceſſary, be, upon the whole, productive of a greater good, that could not have been accompliſhed without that evil, which was, in wiſdom and goodneſs, adapted as the means to that end?

P. 52. Mr. Phipps ſays, "*The ſun of righteouſneſs is the* SAME *thing to the* SOUL OF MAN, *that the ſun in the firmament is to his body.*"—Is it the ſame? The *ſun in the firmament* warms and enlightens *wicked men*, as well as *righteous ones*; the *Idolater*, and *Polytheiſt*, as well as the *Theiſt*, who is no *Idolater*. It enlightens a man as much to commit an *evil action*, as a *good one*, and it is equally propitious to the ſinner and the ſaint; nouriſhes *thorns*, as well as *thiſtles*; and yet, even wicked men do not ſay it is the cauſe of the evil actions which they commit under its *enlightening*

and

and *animating* influence.—The ſun's influence is not withdrawn from an evil man while he commits murder in the day time; nor does it enlighten a good one to ſave a man's life in the night, but purſues its wonted courſe through all the ſigns of the zodiac, and riſes with equal brightneſs *on the evil and on the good*; while *the rain deſcendeth, without partiality, on the juſt and on the unjuſt.*— And do not men hold different opinions concerning objects preſented to them by this *ſame* light? Theſe concluſions are drawn from *his* premiſſes, in which the word SAME, admits of no exception.

P. 71, Apology, Mr. Barclay ſays, the *eternal Word* "*is the fountain of* TRUTH, *and of the ſcrip-*"*tures, and* TRUTH ITSELF;" and that it is the *adequate rule*, &c. but he ſays, the *Word* itſelf is not *God*, but *Vehiculum Dei*, ſee p. 137:— If ſo, the WORD is not the *fountain of truth, and truth itſelf*, which is GOD. In the ſame page he ſays, GOD "*hath wrought all things by his* ETERNAL WORD *and* SON:"— And if the ETERNAL WORD, which took fleſh, *is not the proper eſſence and nature of* GOD, *which cannot be* RESISTED, HURT, WOUNDED, CRUCIFIED, *or* SLAIN, does it not follow that the ETERNAL WORD has a diſtinct eternal eſſence? and that there are two eternal uncreated *ſubſtances* of diſtinct *eſſences*, whereof one is *diviſible*, and the other *indiviſible?* and, of courſe, one *material* and the other *immaterial*, one *conſcious* and *unintelligent*, which the other, *i. e.* GOD, uſed in *creating all things*, and by which he *upholds them*, and, divided into *meaſures*, is an inſtrument in enlightening, ſanctifying, and ſaving intelligent creatures.? † *Athanaſius's Creed* does not appear

† It ſeems, after all, the *Quakers themſelves* do not hold the doctrine of *immediate* revelation; the Holy Spirit, it ſeems,

pear to me more inconſiſtent and irrational, than this *Creed of Mr. Barclay's*; but I do not think that he was aware of, or meant, the concluſions which I have fairly drawn from his own premiſſes; but it ſhews he was not always ſufficiently cautious in laying down poſitions, *firſt principles*, and in affirming them; and, amongſt his authorities, for the *inſufficiency* of the *divine light*, the ſtory of *Hai Ebn Vokdaa*, who, it is ſaid, had, *without converſe of man, immediate converſe with God*, originated in an *Arabic Romance*, which is now at my elbow, and was written to evince that *Mahometiſm* was the *true religion*.

P. 563, Apology, Mr. Barclay grants, "*that* "*defence is of natural right, and that religion de-* "*ſtroys not nature:*" And yet, p. 561, he ſays, that thoſe who fight "*are not Chriſt's, diſciples,* "*or ſervants*;" and this he grounds upon John xviii. 35. "*My kingdom is not of this world*;" which is not, in my opinion, capable of ſupporting it. Chriſt's kingdom is a *ſpiritual* one, and *none* but ſpiritual weapons are to be uſed in it, and, therefore, *Peter* laid hold of the wrong inſtrument to maintain his maſter's cauſe, and was bid to put it up again, but not to throw it away, as unlawful to be uſed on any occaſion. The *civil ſtate*, or a man's *private* property, both *body* and *goods*, may be called a *kingdom of this world*; and *carnal* things are as properly to be defended by *carnal* means, as *ſpiritual* things by *ſpiritual* means.—God, who is OMNIPOTENT, may ſupport a man's body without any food, and yet we find it neceſſary to eat and drink, for the animal life is not to be

ſeems, communicates *not itſelf*, but *ſomewhat* from itſelf; as the *ſoul's organ*, the *word*, *ſeed*, or *light*, is but the *medium* by which God *manifeſts* and *reveals* his will to the *ſoul of man*.

be preſerved by faith only: ſo OMNIPOTENCE might defend a naked *unarmed* man, againſt a body of *armed ruffians*; but we have no more reaſon to think he will do the latter, any more than the former: there may have been inſtances of God's *particular* providence in both caſes, but ſuch are juſtly deemed *miraculous*. — If a man is kept alive for forty days without food, or protected inviſibly againſt a hungry *lion*, or a *ruffian*, who ruſhes toward him and threatens his deſtruction, *natural cauſes* are *over-ruled*, *ſuſpended*, or *deſtroyed*, for the time, as well as the *natural right* of ſelf-defence †; and what reaſon has a man to think that he has a right to defend himſelf, with *carnal weapons*, againſt blood-thirſty animals, who act neceſſarily conformable to the laws of their nature, which are the *laws of God*, but no right to defend himſelf, by *carnal weapons*, againſt blood-thirſty men, no better than lions? In putting ourſelves into a proper poſture of defence, we oftener prevent evil than commit evil. If the *Philadelphians* had not taken up arms, and aſſembled in a body, in all human probability much blood might have been ſhed by the *Banditti*, who were on their march to the city, whereas their well-timed appearance, in arms, was, *under Providence*, the means of preventing blood-ſhed, and maintaining the peace of the city. Their *eminent*, *peaceable*, and *ſenſible*, brother, Dr. PORTSMOUTH, of Alton, in Hampſhire, who attempted, both by rational precept, and example, to remove this *groundleſs ſcruple*, and other *undue prejudices*, in his *brethren*, is not leſs *honouradle* than the moſt *honourable* of them.

Mr.

† Self-defence is a natural right, and when that right is ſuſpended, natural cauſes muſt be ſuſpended too, and a miracle take place.

Mr. Phipps, p. 193, Preſent State, *&c.* ſays, *Our terms of admiſſion are, a free and unforced acquieſcence, upon principle, with* (not the eſſential articles of their particular Chriſtian ſociety, which is farther opened into the myſteries of Chriſtianity than others, but) *the* ESSENTIAL DOCTRINES OF TRUTH AND REAL CHRISTIANITY, and *rules* of the ſociety *founded thereon.* Upon which I obſerve, that a thing cannot exiſt without poſſeſſing that which is eſſential to its exiſtence. The refuſal of *tithes*, *oaths*, and *bearing of arms*, are ſome of the terms of admiſſion into the Quakers communion; theſe therefore, with them, are deemed doctrines of *eſſential truth and Chriſtianity*; and if they really are ſo, no perſon can be a Chriſtian without a belief in, and acquieſcence with, theſe principles: and as the Quakers allow that none but real Chriſtians, who believe in the eſſential doctrines of truth and Chriſtianity, are members of Chriſt's church, unleſs all thoſe who diſbelieve theſe doctrines, and are no members of his church, can be ſaved by ſome other means than the *eſſential* doctrines of *truth* and *Chriſtianity*, (to uſe Mr. Barclay's "*bold phraſe*,") they muſt inevitably be *damned.* Thus, while the Quakers ſay, (ſee Barclay's works, p. 895,) that *hiſtorical or verbal Chriſtianity* (which, they pretend, contains theſe doctrines) is but an *integral* part of the *Chriſtian faith*, or of *Chriſtianity*, they make theſe doctrines, with ſeveral others found in *hiſtorical and verbal Chriſtianity*, the *eſſential* doctrines of *truth* and of *Chriſtianity*, as appears by their *teſtimonies of diſownment* againſt their own members. If the Quakers will *admit* a perſon into their ſociety, who acquieſces in the *eſſential* doctrines of *truth* and *Chriſtianity*, of courſe they ought not to exclude any from it who do not diſbelieve any *eſſential* Chriſtian

Chriſtian doctrine, or tranſgreſs any *rule* founded thereon, which rules muſt be *eſſential* too. The Quakers, as well as others who pretend no *ſupernatural* aid, often make uſe of words without well conſidering their proper meaning, and affirm propoſitions without anticipating others that may be fairly deduced from them. Perhaps it will be ſaid I have done the ſame; if I have, point them out to me, and I will confeſs my errors and retract them: I am not aſhamed of confeſſing an error when I am convinced of it: as a certain author ſays, "*To retract an error, from conviction, is but ſhewing to the world, that we are grown wiſer.*"

P. 79, Mr. Phipps, ſpeaking of the primitive Chriſtians, ſays, that *women, as well as men, were all filled with the Holy Ghoſt, but differently gifted*: Then they were all led by the ONE SPIRIT; and yet, it ſeems, they were not, in theſe pure times, ONE in *faith*, in *charity*, in *principle*, and in *practice*: *ſome faſted*, others did not faſt; *ſome obſerved days*, others obſerved none; *ſome ate meats*, others ſcrupled to eat ſome; ſome *baptized with water*, St. Paul did not, excepting a few, though he circumciſed one; ſome obſerved *circumciſion* and the *Jewiſh ceremonies*, others ſaid, "*If ye are circumciſed, Chriſt ſhall profit you nothing*;" and at another time one of the ſame perſons ſaid, "*Neither circumciſion nor uncircumciſion availeth any thing*:" ſome held, that the goſpel ſhould be preached to the *gentiles*, others ſaid it ſhould be confined to the *houſe of Iſrael*, the *Jews*: St. Peter contradicted St. Paul, and *withſtood him to his face*: between Paul and Barnabas *the contention roſe ſo high, that they walked no more together*; and yet both went on apart, preaching from the ſame influence.

St. Paul became *alike to all men, that he might gain ſome*; *to the* Jews *a* Jew, *to the* Greeks *a* Greek; *and, being crafty, caught them with guile*; and, after having preached againſt the Jewiſh ceremonies, (which occaſioned a tumult,) adviſed by his brethren, who poſſeſſed no other *ſpirit* than that by which St. Paul had preached, he went to two men who were under a vow, and, to *deceive* or *undeceive* the Jews, "*he purified himſelf with* "*them, and entered into the temple.*" See Acts, chap. 21. Though the apoſtles allowed a man to *faſt* or *not* to faſt, to *keep a day* or *not* to keep it, to be *circumciſed* or *not* circumciſed, to eat meats or not eat any, and impoſed no other injunction upon them than to abſtain from things ſtrangled and from blood, the Quakers will not allow any to be led by the *one Spirit of truth*, or to hold the *eſſential doctrines of truth and Chriſtianity*, who pay *tithes* and *church-rates*, take *oaths*, and plead for *ſelf-defence*, or for *marrying by a prieſt*, nor can ſuch be admitted into their Chriſtian ſociety; and yet Mr. Phipps ſays, *We receive members who acquieſce in the* ESSENTIAL DOCTRINES *of* TRUTH *and* CHRISTIANITY, *and the Rules of the Society* FOUNDED THEREON.

Penn's Maxims. "It is a ſevere rebuke upon "us, that God makes us ſo many allowances, "and we make ſo few to our neighbour; as if "charity had nothing to do with religion, or "love with faith, that ought to work by it. "The belief of Jeſus of Nazareth to be the pro-"miſed Meſſiah, the Son and Chriſt of God, "come and ſent from God, to reſtore and ſave "mankind, is the firſt and was then the only re-"quiſite article of faith. — They were baptized "into the faith of Jeſus, and not into numerous "opinions; and this *one* confeſſion, from true

"faith

" faith in the heart, was the ground of their " *church* fellowſhip. Then God's church was at " peace; ſhe throve; there were then no ſnares " of words made to catch men of conſcience " with; then not many words, but much inte- " grity; now much talk and little truth; many " articles, but 'O ye of little faith!" Penn's Works, fol. 532 and 533. —— " The queſtion " is not, whether all the truths contained in the " ſcriptures are not to be believed; but, whether " thoſe truths are equally important; and whe- " ther the belief with the heart, and confeſſion " with the mouth, that Jeſus is the Chriſt and Son " of God, be not as ſufficient now, to entitle a " man to communion here, and ſalvation here- " after, as in thoſe times. If it be alledged, " that this will take in all parties; yea, *ſchiſmatics* " and *heretics* will creep in under this general " confeſſion, ſince few of them will refuſe to " make it; — *I do ſay, it would be a happy day:* " *what man that loves God and Chriſt, ſeeks peace* " *and concord, that would not rejoice if all our ani-* " *moſities and vexations about matters of religion,* " *were buried in this one confeſſion of Jeſus, the great* " *Author and Lord of the Chriſtian religion, ſo often* " *loſt in pretending to conteſt for it?*" Ibid. 534. — Mr. Penn's creed, you ſee, conſiſts of but *one* eſſential *article*; he has not made the belief in *immediate revelation*, or any thing reſpecting *oaths*, *tithes*, or *arms*, an *eſſential article of Chriſtian communion*; but he was of a truly *noble* and *catholic ſpirit*. He did not ſay a ſyllable of rules of ſociety founded on *eſſential doctrines*: what a broad foundation of Chriſtian unity and communion did this wiſe man lay! and no other, it ſeems, than what he ſaid " *was already laid*;" but what a nar-

row one have ſome of the rigid Quakers, who bear rule, adopted in its ſtead!

All men, doubtleſs, have more or leſs of thoſe ſenſations which the Quakers call *divine*, and more or leſs of that knowledge which the Quakers ſay comes by *immediate revelation*, and all parties, as well thoſe who own ſupernatural light and immediate revelation, as thoſe who deny it, agree ultimately, that God is the ſource of knowledge and of all that is good: while ſome ſay it is mediately, and others that it is immediately, derived from him; all agree it is divine in a *certain* ſenſe, though but few grant it in the Quakers ſenſe †; but, without determining which of theſe opinions is true, let all gratefully acknowledge the goodneſs of God, receive every bleſſing with thankfulneſs, and make the beſt uſe of it, (as Mr. Phipps ſays, who ſometimes ſpeaks modeſtly of himſelf,) according to the "*underſtanding given him.*" We have nothing that we did not receive; no wiſe man, therefore, will boaſt of any bleſſing he enjoys, or of any natural or moral powers which he poſſeſſes, as if he had not received them, and was *independent*. God's *grace* is *grace*, whether it is given *mediately* or *immediately* to his creatures. God has ſo conſtituted things, that the ſun enlightens and warms, the rain deſcendeth in refreſhing and fertile ſhowers on the earth, and both conſpire to produce food for man and inferior animals, and fill our barns with plenty, while we are ignorant of their eſſences. "*Lo, theſe are part of his ways, but how little a portion is known of them!*" The ſun, which diſcovers

† Could we diveſt our meaning of allegory, figure, and a peculiar phraſeology, perhaps there would be but little diſagreement among mankind. Moſt of our differences are occaſioned for want of underſtanding one another; but God, who ſees our hearts, will, I hope, accept our honeſt intentions.

diſcovers all objects, is not itſelf a proper object of our inveſtigation, we cannot contemplate it immediately; the more we look upon it, (unleſs it be *darkly, through a glaſs*, ſuch is the weakneſs of our optics,) the more our ſight is dazzled and confounded. God is omnipreſent; *he made us, not we ourſelves; we are his offspring*; but we are ignorant of his eſſence and of our *own*; he knows our frame, while he himſelf is incomprehenſible: the portion of reaſon we poſſeſs is derived from him; but being finite, or limited, it cannot comprehend him who is unlimited, or infinite; and *dwells in light, which no man can approach unto*, 2 Tim. vi. 16. When Moſes enquired his name, he was anſwered, *I am* THAT I AM. It becomes us weak and limited beings to ſpeak modeſtly of our "*notions and* "*apprehenſions of God.*" Wiſe men have told us, "we ſee but darkly, as through a glaſs. *Touch-*"*ing the Almighty, we cannot find him out.*" Job xxxvi. 26. "*Verily, thou art a God that hideſt* "*thyſelf: we may ſpeak much, and yet come ſhort;* "*wherefore, in ſum, he is all. Who hath ſeen him,* "*that he may tell us?*" Eccl. xiv. 26. 33. "*Hard-*"*ly do we gueſs aright at things that are upon earth,* "*and with labour do we find the things that are be-*"*fore us; but the things that are in heaven who hath* "*ſearched out?*" Eccl. iii. 21, 25. "*Such know-*"*ledge is too wonderful for me; it is high, I cannot* "*find it out.*" Iſaiah, xiv. 15. "*Let us not there-*"*fore judge one another.*" Rom. xiv. 13. And, till we can prove that we "have the infallible criterion "in our poſſeſſion," let us rather modeſtly *propoſe* than *affirm*.

Till a doctrine appears to a man to be *true*, can it appear to him to be *divine?* "*If the trumpet* "*gives an uncertain ſound, who ſhall prepare himſelf* "*to the battle?*" "*So, likewiſe you, unleſs ye utter*

"*by*

" *by the tongue words eaſy to be underſtood, how ſhall*
" *it be known what is ſpoken? for ye ſhall ſpeak into*
" *the air.*" " *I had rather ſpeak five words with*
" *my underſtanding, that, by my voice, I might teach*
" *others alſo, than ten thouſand words in an unknown*
" *tongue.*" Cor. xiv. But Peter tells us that Paul had " ſome things hard to be underſtood :" and when we ſpeak of the *nature of God*, and of his *purpoſes*, or of notions or apprehenſions of him, our words, perhaps, will be but few, if they are ſpoken with the underſtanding. " *Once I have*
" *ſpoken, but I will not anſwer; yea, twice, but I will*
" *proceed no farther.*" Job xl. 5. Behmen, by attempting to account for every thing, and the author of every thing, accounted for nothing, but perplexed every thing; and went on, explaining one myſtery by a ſtill greater, till he made every thing more myſterious than ever, and himſelf, poor man, a very myſtery; and, like a ſilk-worm that has ſpun its own fetters, which prove, at length, its grave, entangled by his own conceits and puerilities, he lies, " *wrapt round and round in ſilken*
" *thoughts, which fertile fancy ſpun,*" in impenetrable obſcurity; and his commentators, *Whiteſield*, *Law*, and *Hartley*, have in vain attempted to develope the pſeudoic philoſophy of this reputed *divine Jacob.*

Let me utter a few parables, and then I will conclude. CANDOUR, travelling from Jericho to Jeruſalem, ſaw a company of men, out of the *high-way ſide*, on a *barren ſpot*, who ſeemed to be diſputing very earneſtly. He ſtopped to liſten to them, and found they diſagreed about the name of the *ſun*; which they confeſſed enlightened them all in their journey, and all mankind. One ſaid it was a *natural light*; another ſaid it was a *divine*; another ſaid it was an *idea only within him*; another

ſaid

ſaid it was a *ſubſtance without him*; upon which, *Candour*, who had ſtood a ſilent auditor, ſaid, gentlemen, do you agree that the *ſame* light enlightens you all, whether it be a *ſubſtance* or *accident*, *material* or *immaterial*, *natural* or *divine*? To which they unanimouſly replied in the *affirmative*. Stay no longer, then, diſputing about its name; "*while* "*you have the light, walk in it*;" harmonioufly purſue your journey to Jeruſalem; remember ye are *brethren, fall not out by the way*. Going on a little farther, he ſaw another company of diſputants, and ſtopped again to attend to their diſcourſe. They had *all* got the *ſame diſeaſe*, and diſputed very warmly about the *name* of it, and how they had *contracted it*. One ſaid it was *hereditary*; another that it came by the *contagion of habit*; another ſaid it was *natural*; another that it was *diabolical*. Gentlemen, ſays the *certain man*, diſpute no longer about the *name* and *cauſe* of your diſeaſe; you all agree that you are *diſeaſed*; go on to *Gilead*, and ſeek for a remedy; for you all agree *there is efficacious balm in Gilead, and an able Phyſician there*, (though you call him too by different names,) who knows the *cauſe* of your *diſeaſe* and its *remedy*. No longer *inflame your malady*, by diſputing about its *proper name* and *cauſe*, which God's wiſdom has concealed from your fooliſhneſs; nor can you, by diſputing, find it out, till you are recovered from it. After ſaying thus much, he left them, and departed; and, at length, he eſpied another company, on "*a high hill apart they ſat*," inveloped with a cloud: on approaching toward them, he ſaw that each man had an open *ſcroll* in his hand, at the head of which was written, in bold characters, "*An* "*eaſy method to diſcharge the national debt.*" Every man read his ſcheme; on which it appeared they were all different; and, each man attempting to

prove

prove the rectitude of his own, a learned and warm debate enſued, in the midſt of which, a man, ſervant to the *creditor of them all*, drew near, and preſented them with a liſt of their private debts, and urged the payment of them, which, without *opening*, every man put into his pocket, and the debate on the former ſubject was renewed with as much warmth as ever; on which, *Candour* thus addreſſed them: Gentlemen, you have attempted the *hardeſt* taſk, and ſeem to have neglected the *eaſieſt* and moſt intereſting to yourſelves, as *individuals*: leave diſputing about the *national debt*; let every man aſk himſelf, "*What oweſt thou unto thy* "*Lord?*" and endeavour to purſue the beſt method to diſcharge his own.

Candour paſſed on a little farther, and he ſaw a large company loitering in the way, of different *features, ſizes, ſhapes, complexions*, and *habits*: theſe continually charged one another with ſome *imperfection*; ſome were too *tall*, others too *ſhort*; ſome too *fat*, others too *lean*; ſome went *too upright*, others *ſtooped too much*; ſome took *too long ſteps*, others *too ſhort*; the cloaths of ſome were *too near white*, others *too near black, red, crimſon*, or *yellow*; ſome ſtepped along *ſtrait forwards*, others *waddled too much*, and limped in their gait; and they often *joſtled, rubbed*, and *ſpurned, one another*, crying, "*ſtand off, for I am holier than thou* "*art.*" Gentlemen, ſays Candour, why are you at variance? the ſame Being made you all, and the ſame providence is over you and all his works, whether black, brown, or fair; ſtooping or erect; *&c.* If you all mean to do your beſt, why ſhould you diſagree? *Unleſs* MERCY *covers the judgement-ſeat, to a hair's breadth, and* CHARITY *covers a multitude of ſins, which of you can be ſaved?* Pity the imperfections you ſee in another, and do not attempt to

ſpurn

ſpurn the weakeſt and turn the lame out of the way; let the ſtrong bear with the weak: "*Be kindly affectioned one towards another:*" "*Be of the ſame mind one towards another:*" "*It is not in man that walketh to direct his ſteps:*" And enter not into doubtful diſputations. *Candour* went on a little farther, and overtook another company, who had all ſome *natural imperfection*, which, concealed from *themſelves*, was obvious to the *reſt*; and therefore, thinking themſelves perfect, or "*without ſpot, wrinkle, or any ſuch thing*," they alternately reproached one another, and ſaid, *with ſuch imperfections, you never can be admitted into the city of New Jeruſalem.* *Candour*, taking a *mirror* out of his pocket, held it up to them, one after another, and convinced them that every one had ſome deformity of which they had been unacquainted; they all appeared to be confounded, and, at length, ſhook hands, and ſaid, *if any man ſays he has no ſin, (or imperfection,) he deceives himſelf*; and they agreed no more to reproach one another. *Candour* proceeded a little farther, and he ſaw a number in tears, aſſembled round the corpſe of a man, the only "*ſon of his mother, and ſhe was a widow.*" Dry up your tears, ſaid he, ye ſorrow as thoſe that are *without hope.* It is as natural to die as to be born; to go out of this world as to come into it: the deceaſed is taken from you, but not from him that made him; with all his imperfections on his head, *he is fallen into the hands of God, and not into the hands of men*; his Maker will deal with him according to the rectitude of his own attributes; with him there is *plenteous redemption*; he has greater power to *reſtore*, than "*limited envy to defile and deſtroy*;" and wants neither *will* nor *power* to accompliſh the redemption of his creatures.

God, the *author of nature*, by the laws called *gravity*, *attraction*, and *repulsion*, produces the *natural phænomena*; and by the *rational spirit*, intimately connected with certain portions of organized matter, surrounded with, and perpetually acted upon by, other bodies, different ideas are excited, and different impressions are necessarily made upon it; and no power, that is not superior to the *power of these laws*, which is *God's power*, can *counteract*, *alter*, *suspend*, or *prevent*, *their influence:* whatever, therefore, happens to us, whether pleasing sensations and ideas or painful ones, happen to us necessarily, and agreeably to his divine will who has established the laws which produce them: and, if he does not "*afflict willingly* "*the children of men*," nor the offspring of *inferior animals*, or merely to display his power, we may conclude, that the seeming *ill* we deplore, and the *good* we praise, are equally the effects of the divine goodness. Every thing is by his *grace*; by his *grace* man is *born*, by his *grace* he *dies*; by his *grace* he enjoys *pleasure*, by his *grace* he feels *pain*; by his *grace* the gentle whispering zephyrs breathe a refreshing breeze and moderate the heat; by his *grace* earthquakes convulse parts of the earth, which open and swallow up *cities*, with *men*, *women*, *children*, and *beasts*; by his *grace the pestilence walketh in darkness, and destruction wasteth at noon day.* Psalm xci. 6. He is just, equal, and gracious, in all his ways, though those ways are "*past find-* "*ing out.*" Whatever powers we possess are *God's gifts:* the *light* † and the *power of vision* are *God's gifts*; an *appetite* and *digestion* as well as *food*, with *reason*,

† The giving a *substance* a wrong name, cannot alter its *nature*, *change its properties*, or prevent *its physical operation* and *influence*. The *properties* and *influence* of the SUN are the same, whether we call it a *natural* or *divine light*; and *bread* would be as nutritive, if we called it a *stone* or a *poison*.

reaſon, or *underſtanding*, are *God's gifts*; and of theſe there are a great variety and innumerable degrees among intelligent beings; and when they are deprived of *any*, or of *all*, theſe gifts, the Lord, who *gave*, ſeeth meet to take *away*; and "*bleſſed* "*be the name of the Lord*," who is equally wiſe, good, and praiſe-worthy, in giving and in taking away, in what he grants, and in what he denies, his creatures. In health and in ſickneſs, in adverſity and in proſperity, in life and in departing out of it, let us "*give thanks always*," *let all that have breath praiſe the Lord.*

CANDOR paſſed on yet a little farther, and ſaw an old man, bending under the weight of age and infirmities, with one hand upon his loins, and, with the other, leaned upon his ſtaff; CANDOR accoſted him, with "*Art thou in health, my bro-*"*ther?*" *I am in much pain, God be praiſed*, ſays the old man, whoſe name was RESIGNATION:—A few years ago I was ſeized with the diſorder called the Gravel, and, *I thank God, it gets worſe and worſe.* But why do you make illneſs or pain a ſubject of thankſgiving? Becauſe, I think, it is a proper ſubject, replied the old man, and a wiſer man than I ſaid, "*I am glad that I was af-*"*flicted*; *I glory in my infirmities*; *I glory in tribu-*"*lation*; GOD'S WILL BE DONE." I hope his will will ultimately ſanctify me in ſuch a manner, *by pain*, as to enable me to exiſt, at length, *without pain*, and, from a *partial evil*, produce *an univerſal good:* beſides, ſays the old man, it has already produced ſome good to others, and will, in the end, I do not doubt, turn out to my advantage.—A poor worthy man, a doctor in our town, and his large family, were ſtarving before I was taken ill, and was juſt on the point of committing *felo de ſe*, but, on my application to him for me-

dicines, with a few other people of property, labouring under different diſeaſes, the man emerged from his pit of deſpair, and is now able to maintain his family comfortably, and goes on *his way rejoicing*, and *praiſing the good providence of God*; and, being diſabled from following my buſineſs, I left it to a perſon who had long been out of trade, and he alſo got a comfortable living: beſides, you know, as the old ſaying is, all trades muſt live, *nurſes*, *undertakers*, and *grave-makers*, cannot live on the air; and, you know, all mankind cannot follow one trade; there are already ſo many different branches that a few are next to ſtarving; and if, "*whatever is right*," it may not be right that all mankind ſhould think ſo. *Candor* could not perceive the rectitude of all theſe ſtrange notions, nor did he know what to anſwer, and therefore he departed in ſilence. I leave my readers to expound theſe parables at their leiſure: "*he that can receive it, let him receive it.*"

Some people are ſo fond of *myſtery*, that true religion, in their apprehenſions, is made up of nothing but *myſteries*, as every metal in the hands of the *alchymiſts* ſoon becomes *gold*. — *Great*, ſay they, *are the myſteries of the kingdom of heaven*: true; but are we not told, that the way to it is no myſtery at *all?* that we may even *run and read*, and that *that way-faring man, though a fool, ſhall not err in it*: we are in the *kingdom of this world at preſent*; let us be contented in our ignorance of the *myſteries of the kingdom of heaven* till we arrive there, and then they may be opened to us: the diſputes of mankind about them are generally maintained at the expence of that virtue, *charity*, without which we are not to expect to get there at all, and even the knowledge of them would profit us nothing: while people warmly

diſpute

diſpute about them, and the faith once delivered to the ſaints, perhaps the leading motive may be rather who ſhall be *uppermoſt*, than *orthodox*, or who ſhall be the reputed *wiſeſt* and *greateſt*, rather than who ſhall be the *beſt* and *moſt virtuous*, not conſidering that the reputed *leaſt*, already arrived *in the kingdom of heaven*, is *wiſer* and *greater* than all of them.

"*Wait the great teacher, death, and God adore.*"
POPE.

After all that has been ſaid and written on many myſterious paſſages of ſcripture, perhaps, it may be eaſier to determine, *negatively*, what they do *not mean*, than, *affirmatively*, what they *do*; however, where the *holy ſcriptures* are *myſterious*, frail man ſhould be *more cautious* than *confident* †, for when people write *about it, and about it*, in a manner ſcarce intelligible to one another, or to themſelves, and, quarrelling, call one another *dogs, whores, fools, knaves, impoſtors, ſerpents, vipers*, and the *devil's agents*, which has too often been the caſe, about the atonement and ſacrifice of Chriſt, the Trinity, hypoſtaſes, reſurrection, called the *myſtery of godlineſs*, and the *new birth*, they certainly manifeſt a great ignorance of *both*, and the candid, diſpaſſionate, by-ſtander will pity the miſtakes of ſuch well-meaning miſtaken men, while they cry, *Fie, fie, gentlemen*; *fie, fie*; *put up, put up, put up*. No longer contend, *without charity*, about a religion, the *eſſence* of which you agree is *charity*: be not dogmatical, at beſt you ſee but *darkly, as through a glaſs*.

None are more buſy, to uſe Mr. Phipps's words, to lead the blind, than ſome of the blind, (though I do

† See preſent State of Man, p. 219.

I do not mean any reflection on Phipps and Barclay,) or to cenſure others for not ſeeing what they themſelves do not ſeem to comprehend: diſpute no longer about matters which the *wiſdom of God* has hid from the *fooliſhneſs* of man; abate of your confidence; *love as brethren*; *be pitiful, be courteous*; *the ſervant of the Lord*, who is no *tool* of a party, *ſhould not ſtrive, but be patient toward all men.*

Mr. Fox, and Mr. Barclay, with all their *imperfections on their heads*, in my opinion, had not any greater, but much fewer, than the two *firſt* reformers, *Calvin* and *Luther*; and they were, perhaps, of more real ſervice to mankind†. *Moſes* led the *Iſraelites* out of *Egypt* into the wilderneſs, and there he left them; but *Joſhua* conducted them into the land of *Canaan*:— though I mean to make no indecent compariſon between *Moſes*, *Luther*, and *Calvin*, nor between *Joſhua*, *Fox*, and *Barclay*. *Calvin* and *Luther* expoſed the *wickedneſs* and *fallibility* of the *Pope* and *popiſh prieſts*, and reſcued multitudes from the *papal yoke*, but they ſubjected them to another of the ſame kind, and kept them in a *waſte, howling wilderneſs*, in a ſtate of dependence upon *prieſts* ſtill.

Fox and Barclay agreed, with the *firſt reformers*, that the "*kingdoms of this world ſhould become the "kingdoms of the Lord and of Chriſt*;" but they did not underſtand, by this text, that all *kingdoms of the world* were to become the *kingdoms of men*, who, at laſt, were but the *ſervants of the Lord, and of his Chriſt*, or be ſubjected to the dominion and tyranny of *prieſts*, who attempted to cram them with ſpiritual food that they could not digeſt;

† Though the Quakers decry human reaſon, yet, I think, their principles and practices are more *rational, upon the whole*, than thoſe of any other *body* of religioniſts.

geſt; and, in lieu thereof, demanded a certain part of their property and *temporal food*. They did not underſtand, as the celebrated *Milton* ‡ ſays, that "*prieſts ſhould oblige people to pay them for "learning them that religion, which Chriſt had left "to their own choice, whether they would learn it at "all.*" *Fox*, therefore, and *Barclay*, evinced the *wickedneſs* and *fallibility* of *Proteſtant prieſts* too, and convinced multitudes that *prieſts* had no *divine* or *natural right* to dictate to people's *conſciences*, or *tithe their property*, for preaching up that *goſpel* which the author of it gave *freely* to his miniſters, and ordered them to diſpenſe *freely* to the people.

The clergy, at length, ſorely preſſed by the Quakers, who ſuffered as well as argued for their teſtimony, gave up their claim of *jure divino*, and grounded it only on human laws; but this has no foundation in reaſon or common-ſenſe. The original law, reſpecting tithes, was founded on the then declared and undiſputed claim of *divine right*, that ſhewed they were heirs of the inheritance, and the human law only enabled them to take poſſeſſion of it: having, therefore, given up their original pretended divine right, they have declared againſt the baſis of the human, which gave them a legal power of poſſeſſion, and given up the ſole foundation of their claim. The Quakers attacked prieſt-craft, at the peril of their lives, in its *ſtrong-hold*, which it had maintained for many centuries with impunity, and ſilenced thoſe tremendous batteries which it had raiſed in the name of the Lord, in oppoſition to Chriſtianity, reaſon, and common-ſenſe. No ſooner was the plough invented, than prieſt-craft impoſed an exorbitant tax on it, which remains unto this day, and makes its wheels move on heavily, while its follower

‡ See his *Way to move Hirelings out of the Church.*

follower paſſes along complaining, and can find no effectual remedy for the grievance. The *Quakers* firſt ſtood forth againſt it, like *David againſt Goliah*, and in this inſtance have erected a noble ſtandard, and lifted up an enſign to the nations, and, it is to be hoped, they will not themſelves deſert it, while numbers are flocking to it from every quarter under heaven, by letting their teſtimony fall to the ground. Their refuſal of the payment of tithes has been the means of diſplaying prieſt-craft to the world, that *myſtery of iniquity, which began ſo early to work*, and which never *worked* any thing but *miſchief*, and by maintaining their teſtimony againſt it in this inſtance, they will do good ſervice to the cauſe of true religion, of reaſon, and the eſſential intereſts of mankind.

Fox and *Barclay*, and the primitive Quakers, were not angels, but men; and, like the modern Quakers, not free from human weakneſſes and infirmities: we can do the memory of wiſe and good men no greater injury, than by attempting to juſtify thoſe errors which, had they lived to ſee them, they would have been the firſt to condemn themſelves.

Mr. Phipps, p. 17, after ſaying, "*that evil is* "*an imperfection adventitious to man's nature*," aſſerts ſome propoſitions which afford a gleam of ſubſtantial delight to my heart, and excite its approbation: 1ſt, That, by an "*all-powerful prin-* "*ciple, he may be recovered from it, and his nature* "*reſtored to a fitneſs for union with his Maker*:" 2dly, That "*uncreated omnipotence is certainly more* "*able to cleanſe, than the creaturely, corrupt, fallen,* "*powers of darkneſs are to defile*:" 3dly, That "*infinite goodneſs muſt be as ready to effect the firſt, as* "*limited envy the laſt*." If, therefore, man's diſtemper

temper is not *incurable*, and God wants neither *will* nor *power* to cure it, (without determining on the abſtruſe queſtions concerning *fate* and *free-will*,) may we not hope that *all men* will ultimately be cleanſed, made whole, and united to their common Father, "*the God of the ſpirits of all fleſh*," and be happy for ever?

Mr. Barclay, too, ſays, (p. 122, Apol.) "*There "is no man for whom Chriſt did not taſte death.*"— If ſo, I hope there is no man for whom he taſted it *in vain*, or that will not finally be ſaved with an everlaſting ſalvation. So wiſheth, ſo prayeth, a lover of truth, a friend of Phipps, Beeſley, Newton, and of *all mankind*.

Every *herd* of animals has ſome who take the lead; every *flock* of ſheep has ſome bell-wethers; and the generality of every ſociety (ſome of whom are not as harmleſs, but as ſilly as ſheep) whether *civil*, *political*, or *religious*, is governed by a few *religious* ſocieties in particular, for there is not any thing mankind in general can eaſier take upon *truſt* than matters of religion, which concern them the *moſt*; their religion comes to them with their eſtates, by inheritance, and they make no doubt of having an equal *natural* and *divine right*. Men of great zeal, ſtrong paſſions, little knowledge, and ſtill leſs charity, confident, *beyond meaſure*, that they poſſeſs the Spirit, in *ſome meaſure*, too frequently take the lead in religious ſocieties; and, while they pretend to make *men diſciples of Chriſt*, render them only the diſciples of *themſelves*, who, at beſt, are but *his diſciples*; and, while they pretend to be the *ſervants of all, for Chriſt's ſake*, they rule, without ſeeming to rule, over all, for their own. The Quakers are not free from *blind zealots*, and *bigots*, who too often take the lead of *better ſenſe*, but they have many *judicious* men amongſt them, who, as *gentlemen*, *merchants*, *tradeſ-*

men, and *citizens*, are an honour to the *ſociety*, and to *human nature*; and, while they contribute liberally to the maintenance of the poor in their own ſociety, the *worthy*, indigent, paupers, whether *Jews*, *Turks*, or *Heathens*, find an eaſy acceſs to their preſence, and never depart from it unrelieved, or without being convinced, that it is not in their power to relieve them.

And *I do moſt firmly and aſſuredly believe*, that *myſelf* and *all* mankind are favoured with the *ſame light* (whether it be called *natural* or *divine*) as the *Quakers* are favoured with, and for which I am humbly thankful to the *Author of all good*. But as, under the *light of the ſame ſun*, which ſhines in the *natural world* upon *all men*, *all men* do not form the ſame ideas of *all* objects around them, (which may be owing either to a *natural defect* in the *optic nerves themſelves*, or to the want of a proper inveſtigation of objects preſented to them,) ſo the difference in opinions among mankind, who comprehend moral objects by the *ſame medium*, *or light*, is, I believe, owing to either an *inherent defect* in the *rational faculties themſelves*, on which the *light ſhines*, or to the want of *adequate* application of *thoſe faculties*, in an inveſtigation of *moral* or *mental objects*: I mean not to DEIFY *human nature*, or *human reaſon*, nor to HUMANIZE the DIVINE. Man has no *ſufficiency of himſelf*, but the *ſufficiency* is of the ONE GOD, who is the ONLY SELF-SUFFICIENT BEING, and in whom we *live*, *move*, and have our *inſufficient* and *dependent being*, whoſe preſence we cannot flee, and whoſe providential notice we cannot eſcape, who deals with all his creatures according to the rectitude of his own attributes, which are INCOMPREHENSIBLE, though it may be in a manner contrary to the *imperfect puerile opinions* formed by our frail *rational* MODICUM.

POST-

POSTSCRIPT.

THE devil, or ſerpent, who was with our firſt parents in paradiſe, declared three things in his converſe with Eve: he was a liar in the beginning of that converſe; but did he not end it with a truth? — "*God doth know, that, in the* "*day ye eat thereof, then ſhall your eyes be o-* "*pened, and ye ſhall be as Gods, knowing good* "*and evil.*" And after they had eaten of the fruit, the Lord God ſaid, "*Behold, the man is* "*become as one of us, to know good and evil.*" But Mr. Phipps will have it that they loſt God's image, inſtead of becoming like God; and that their knowledge of good and evil was the "re-"verſe" of God's.

Adam, before his fall, Mr. Phipps ſays, was ſo wiſe, as to have an "*intuitive diſcerning of the* "*creation*;" but after his fall, when his eyes were opened, to know good and evil, and to ſee his nakedneſs, he had not wit enough left to make himſelf a coat: the utmoſt ſtretch of his invention reached no higher than that of a fig-leaf apron, which was inſufficient; *for unto Adam, and alſo to his wife, did the Lord God make coats of ſkins, and covered them.* Gen. chap. iii. Upon which I obſerve, our firſt parents were not driven naked out of paradiſe, on to that *ground* which God had curſed for their ſakes, and has bleſſed to his poſterity, by furniſhing them out of it with both food and clothing.

The SUN *phyſically blinds* ſome animals, who can ſee beſt in its abſence, and enlightens others, who cannot ſee at all in its abſence: it *ſcorches*

and *conſumes* ſome bodies, and *preſerves* ſome, while it ſcarce *warms* others: it *hardens* ſome bodies, and *ſoftens* others; *generates* ſome, and *corrupts* others; hatches the eggs of deſtructive animals in the wholeſome fruit, while it ripens it; gives life to maggots in the *heart of the roſe*, whoſe beautiful colour depends upon its rays; and while it meliorates our moſt delicious food, it animates the worms within it, which prey on its core. But though the SUN is ſometimes the cauſe of *darkneſs*, *corruption*, and *impurity*, as well as of *light*, *generation*, and *purity*, it is not itſelf *dark*, *corrupt*, and *impure*; but, like the *grace of God*, has its "*proper effect*" upon every thing.

The *ſame* SUN, which matures wholeſome fruit for the ſuſtenance of our *bodies*, and exhales particles which produce a perfume that is grateful to our *ſenſes*, alſo cauſes a ſolution of continuity, and diſſolves others whoſe *effluvium* is very offenſive to our *ſenſes* and pernicious to *health*. But Mr. Phipps will not grant, that the ſame *divine light*, which is the efficient cauſe of *virtuous diſpoſitions* and *good works*, that yield a *good ſavour* to the *internal moral ſenſe*, and are of uſe to ſociety, is alſo the cauſe of thoſe *vicious diſpoſitions* and *evil works* which yield a *bad ſavour* to the *internal moral ſenſe*, and are *pernicious* to ſociety. Mr. Phipps's SAME ſimile "*cannot run on all four*" legs, nor ſcarce *hop upon one*. I hope he will find a better againſt *abſolute neceſſity*, in his next, or a diſciple of *Zeno* will be more than a match for him: — "*I made a proſperous voyage when I ſuffered ſhipwreck.*" See Diogenes Laertius.

To ſum up the whole, that modification of the mind called SINCERITY, appears to me, in the *firſt*, as well as *laſt*, *ſtage of life*, to be the *main foundation of piety*. Such is the nature and conſtitution

ſtitution of the human mind, (which nature or conſtitution it did not give itſelf,) that it muſt believe thoſe propoſitions to be true, which appear to it to be true, and, *vice verſa*; and to believe, therefore, according to the apparent truth of things, is to believe according to the law of its nature, or the will of God, who is the author of that law: men frequently believe contrary to external evidence, or the teſtimony of their ſenſes, but cannot believe contrary to a *preſent internal ſenſe* †. When a man believes that the bread and wine, after conſecration, are tranſubſtantiated into another ſubſtance, while the ſpecies *appeared*, viewed through his external ſenſes, or bodily organs, to be numerically the ſame, it is from an *internal ſenſe*, which makes him diſcredit the evidence of his *external ſenſes*, or *corporeal organs*. Man is alſo ſo conſtituted, that when he acts, if it be in his power to act, and, if not, means to act according to the *apparent* truth of things, or *preſent* ſenſe of duty, he certainly means to do right, and cannot offend God, who regards not the *action*, which is but the *modification of matter*, but the *intent* or *meaning* of the agent, which is the *modification of the mind*; and, therefore, a moral ſenſe of pleaſure neceſſarily attends his obedience; and, *vice verſa*, the moral ſenſe of pain, called *condemnation*, always follows, as an *effect*, from a preceding *internal conſcious ſenſe* of having done, or omitted to do, ſomething that we ought not to have done, or omitted: while a man follows, therefore, or neglects to follow, the dictates of *his internal ſenſe*, whether *rightly* or *wrongly* informed, he feels a moral ſenſe of pleaſure, or of pain.

† This internal ſenſe ſome called *divine*, others *natural*, others *reaſon*, others *conſcience*, but all mean that which is the cauſe of *conviction*, *information*, *condemnation*, and *juſtification*.

pain. What the apoſtle has ſaid, is, in my opinion, applicable to people of every nation under heaven, whether *Jew*, *Turk*, or *Heathen*: "*If* "*thy* own *heart condemns thee not, then haſt thou* "*confidence toward God; but, if thine own heart* "*condemns thee, remember that God is greater, and* "*will condemn thee alſo*;" and, therefore, I conclude, that the ſincere *Jews*, or *Heathens*, who have *wrong notions of God*, to whom the doctrines of the *life*, *miracles*, *death*, *reſurrection*, *atonement*, and *ſacrifice* of *Chriſt*, have been declared, or propounded, and yet cannot perceive them to be true, do not *ſin*; are not guilty of "*damnable un-*"*belief*;" neither do they want the "*main foun-*"*dation of piety*."

Different bodies, among the ſame ſpecies of beings, are not equally nouriſhed by the ſame ſpecies of food; one man's food is another's poiſon; and what is highly grateful to one man's palate, is the moſt nauſeous to ſome others. Suppoſe any man, or body of men, were to declare, that they had a *true taſte*, and that every one who had a *true taſte* muſt reliſh *oyſters*, *turtle*, *veniſon*, and *porter*, as they do, would not *Candor* pity their deluſion? We ſee that *temperate* men, while they are in health, have different taſtes for food, and the ſame man, at different times; we ſee alſo, that different kinds of food agree beſt with, and are moſt nutritive, to different men, and to the ſame man at different times; and all *ſenſe*, properly ſpeaking, is *inward*, *mental*, or *internal*; it is the ſoul that perceives and feels. Thus people, equally pious and ſincere, cannot help thinking, and believing, perhaps, more different and contrary notions, than there are taſtes, and ſpecies of food: notions and practices, that produce comfortable "*ſenſations* "*felt at heart*" in ſome people, occaſion diſagree-

able

able ones in others: the doctrine that is *odious* and *damnable* to ſome people, is *ſoul-ſaving* to others; and a man's *palate*, and *digeſtion*, together with his *experience of the effects of foods*, can only be the *adequate rule* to judge of wholeſome and pleaſant food to himſelf, ſo a man's *internal*, *moral ſenſe*, by which he taſtes *doctrines* and *practices*, can be an *adequate rule* to no other man than *himſelf*; he may recommend both his wholeſome, *carnal*, and *ſpiritual* food, as it it is natural to a benevolent man to attempt to do good, and promote the happineſs of his fellow-creatures, both in a *temporal* and *ſpiritual* ſenſe; but let him not ſay, they commit *ſin*, *offend God*, and will be *damned*, if they do not reliſh it, or if it has not the ſame effects upon them as it has upon himſelf, but rather, as Chriſt ſaid, (when he has propounded his doctrine) let him conclude with, "*he that can receive* "*it*, *let him receive it*," and not boldly affirm, as I think ſome people have incautiouſly done, that, if we are led or governed by the *one Spirit*, we ſhall be *one* in *faith*, in *principle*, and in *practice*.

God has ſo conſtituted things, that our *bodies* are kept alive, during his pleaſure, and are ſupported, in *health*, by *different kinds of food*; and is it *impoſſible* that our *ſouls* ſhould be *ſaved*, and made happy, by the influence of *different* doctrines, or means?— Infinite wiſdom and goodneſs, knows infinitely better that we can comprehend how to adapt the *means* to the *end* he has deſigned.

The E N D.

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